

# MANUAL : 3 STEPS FOR WORKING IN FRAGILE AND CONFLICT-AFFECTED SITUATIONS (WFCS)



IMPRESSUM:

This Manual was developed by HELVETAS Swiss Intercooperation together with the Centre for Peacebuilding (KOFF) at swisspeace. It aims at providing hands on guidance to field-based staff of development organisations that are working in fragile and conflict affected situations.

Publication written by: Esther Marthaler (HELVETAS Swiss Intercooperation), Sidonia Gabriel (KOFF)

Comments: KOFF team, Celestine Kroesschell (HELVETAS Swiss Intercooperation), Nara Weigel (HELVETAS Swiss Intercooperation), Jacques Mérat (HELVE-TAS Swiss Intercooperation), Simone Notz (HELVETAS Swiss Intercooperation), Cordula Reimann (CORE) Design monitoring/photo editing: Andrea Peterhans Layout: Helen James, Ito Joyoatmojo

Photographs: Peter Schmied, Meinrad Schader, Alfonso Zirpoli, Helvetas, Flurina Rothenberger, Sarah Niemeyer, Tanja Demarmels, Zerah

Since the discussion around international assistance and development work in conflict-affected situations started in the 90s, many tools and guidelines have been developed. Some are more hands-on, others less. With many colleagues at KOFF/swisspeace we have lived and worked with different tools and approaches intending to make development and humanitarian work more suitable or adapted to difficult contexts.

The Do No Harm approach of Mary Anderson and her colleagues at CDA has certainly been one of the main inspirations and the crucial eye-opener for many of us. Significant parts of the 3-Step approach are based on Do-No-Harm thinking.

However, after more than 8 years of advising development and humanitarian organisations, we felt that it was time to provide our colleagues in the field with a tailor-made hands-on guide, a tool and state-of-the-art conceptual thinking to take sensitivity to conflict and fragility into their own hands.

Together with KOFF/swisspeace and all our colleagues in the field we embarked on a long and inspiring journey to develop the 3-Step approach, the corresponding manual and the field guide. Numerous workshops, meetings and discussions, allowed us to get crucial feedback from colleagues in the field.

We especially thank the colleagues from the HELVETAS Swiss Intercooperation country programmes in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Guatemala, Mali and Kyrgyzstan. We are very grateful for all the time, energy, thoughts and reflections they shared with us, which was decisive for the elaboration of the manual and the field guide.

We also thank Nara Weigel and Simone Notz for comments and editing.

The comprehensive 3-Step Manual for working in fragile and conflictaffected situations (WFCS) is providing guidance of how to introduce the topic of working in FCS (fragile and conflict-affected situations), explains key concepts and contains the actual 3-Step tool. It is made for men and women who facilitate WFCS workshops as well as focal points and project managers.



Esther Marthaler



Sidonia Gabriel



| CONCEPT AND PREPARATIONS  | 5             |
|---|---------------|
| Preface and overview  | 5             |
| Introduction<br>What is Different in Fragile and Conflict Affected Situations?  | <b>8</b><br>8 |
| How can the 3-Step approach to WFCS help practitioners?<br>What's the Difference between Sensitivity to Conflict and                          | 11            |
| Fragility and Risk Management?  | 11            |
| WFCS and Peacebuilding  | 12            |
| Basic considerations (for Facilitators)   | 13            |
| The 3-Steps in a nutshell<br>Overview of the Three Steps  | 14<br>15      |
| Stakeholders involved in the different steps of the manual  | 16            |
| Recommendations and advise for preparation  | 17            |
| Key concepts (for Facilitators)   | 23            |
| Fragility and Conflict  | 27            |
| A. Actors relevant for fragility and conflict   | 27            |
| <ul><li>B. Two realities (sources of tensions and connecting elements)</li><li>C. Sources of Tensions (SOT) and Connecting Elements</li></ul> | 27            |
| (CE) are not individual people  | 28            |
| D. Governance factors in fragile and conflict-affected situations   | 29            |
| THE TOOL  | 33            |
|   | 55            |
| CONFLICT SENSITIVITY IN THE PROJECT CYCLE MANAGEMENT  | 65            |
|   |               |
| ANNEX   | 71            |
| Figures & tables  | 119           |
| Acronyms  | 120           |

.....



## CONCEPT AND PREPARATIONS

## PREFACE AND OVERVIEW

#### Who is this Manual for?

This manual was produced to provide hands-on guidance to staff and partners of development organisations that are working in FCS. It contains one section, which provides guidance for facilitators and explains key concepts and key terms. The subsequent 3-Step section is also available as hands-on standalone field guide to conduct analysis and adaptation of a project working in fragile and conflict-affected situations.

Why should you as a development practitioner worry about conflict and fragility? A short reply is that any project set in a conflict-prone region has an impact on the peace and conflict environment – be it positive or negative, direct or indirect, intentional or unintentional. As a development practitioner, you should be aware of this interaction between your project activities and the local conflict / fragile context and act so that you do not worsen the conflict, but rather maximise your potential contribution to strengthening social cohesion and peace. What it means is that you as an individual and development organisation work in a conflict sensitive manner.

Conflict sensitivity is defined as the ability of an organisation to a) understand the context in which it is operating (including intergroup tensions, the divisive issues and those that have the potential to strengthen social cohesion); b) understand the interaction between its ir tervention and that context; c) act on that understanding in order to avoid exacerbating a fragile and conflict situation and instead strengthen local capacities for peace. This means paying particular attention to the consequences of the actions, resource transfers, behaviours and messages sent through the project implementation process.

More than 10 years of experience have shown that conflict sensitive project management can be crucial for ensuring that development projects achieve their development goals. Below are some examples from HELVETAS Swiss Intercooperation's experience.

#### How to use this manual?

The manual is a hands-on guidance to working in fragile and conflictaffected situations and a tool to put in practice conflict sensitivity. It can be applied to all levels, e.g. project, programme or strategy.

The 3-Steps of working in fragile and conflict-affected situations (WFCS) can be applied to all interventions of humanitarian aid, development cooperation and conflict transformation/peacebuilding in fragile situations.

## Two different versions are available:

THE 3-STEPS MANUAL For facilitators, focal points and program/project managers Comprehensive manual (background, preparations for facilitators, key concepts, tool, PCM) THE 3-STEPS FIELD GUIDE For implementers

3-Steps field guide for project level implementation (introduction and the tool of the 3-Steps Manual)

## CONCEPT AND

## PREPARATIONS

#### **Case Studies:**

## Conflict Sensitivity Can Save Lives - A Story from Afghanistan

In July 2010, a traumatic event took place in HELVETAS Swiss Intercooperation Afghanistan. While the campaign for provincial elections was in full swing, three project staff - an engineer, an English teacher and a computer teacher – had to travel from Kabul to Khamard district (their duty station). They travelled in two rented vehicles, both from Kahmard, which they had serviced in Kabul. Because INGO cars have orange registration plates, they are easily identified and consequently their passengers are very vulnerable to attacks from Armed Opposition Groups. Hence, for security reasons, the organisation uses rented vehicles when driving outside the project areas. For personal reasons, the staff members decided to change the itinerary without prior security clearance and headed towards the capital town of a contested province. On the way an armed group that turned out to be Taliban stopped them. The Taliban forced the project staff to stop, threatened them with knives and guns, and made the drivers go off the main road and drive towards a remote village.

In the early afternoon the HELVETAS office in Kabul received a call from one of the abducted colleagues and got to know about their fate as well as the identity of the Taliban group that had captured them.

After a while it became clear that the kidnapping was based on a misunderstanding and that the Taliban thought that the two vehicles were part of the election campaign crew of a political leader of the province which was supposed to travel by the same road that morning. The Taliban were misled by the type of cars (4 runners) often used by election campaigners and because the two cars were transporting only three persons whereas public transport in Afghanistan is always crowded. What made things worse: the driver of one car stuck a paper on the window in the rear to protect passengers from the sunshine. Unfortunately, that paper happened to be the poster of the election candidate that the Taliban wanted. The driver did not choose a poster with a candidate on purpose, he just felt the paper was large enough to fit the window size, no matter what was printed on it.

The management team in Kabul was questioned over the phone by the Taliban and had to provide full information on the organisation and its work, e.g. who is funding the organisation, whether it had any links to the US and NATO troops, where it works, what its activities are, etc. When the Taliban had this background information, they contacted local communities where HELVETAS works in order to get their views on the organisation and the quality of its work. The communities described HELVETAS' working approach, confirming that the organisation works in full transparency and in a truly participatory manner, respects the cultural and religious values, and supports the communities upon their demand and is well linked with ALL stakeholders in the area.. They were not only able to provide detailed information about the projects but they were also well informed about HEL-VETAS as an organisation, its way of working and its principles. They said that the organisation is helping them to improve their living conditions. After several days in captivity, the Taliban concluded their investigations and released the staff, unharmed.

#### Natural Resource Management in Guatemala

One of HELVETAS Swiss Intercooperation's projects in Guatemala aimed at enhancing citizen participation and good governance at municipal level, in particular in the management of the natural resources within the municipalities, e.g. through community forestry. When project implementation started, it became clear that achieving this goal would be extremely difficult, as municipal border delimitations were unclear – a major cause of conflict between concerned municipalities. For the project this meant that often it was not clear to which municipality a community and its territory belonged, which in turn made supporting communities and promoting community forestry a highly political and sensitive issue. Also, forests are sometimes contested territory and claimed by armed groups. The restricted access due to fights over forest allocation meant that even if community leaders would be trained in community forestry, community participation was not guaranteed.

This power-play between municipal authorities resulting in wide-spread inter-municipal violence, compounded by insecurity due to the presence of armed groups, made working with rural populations extremely difficult. Municipal authorities – key partners of the project –were heavily occupied with defining boundaries and resolving local conflicts arising from the described context. Although this was not part of the project, staff started to work on resolving conflicts, by trying to bring in external mediators or by trying to convince armed groups to stop illegal logging in protected areas. This in turn brought HSI staff into focus of armed groups, which posed serious security risks. When the staff realised that their actions hat put them at a great risk, they asked for external support and training in conflict resolution and mediation. As the management had not been informed in time and such activities were not included in the budget, their demands could only partly be met.

#### Construction of Water Wells in Kenya (courtesy from Swisspeace / KOFF)

Women in remote areas of Kenya usually walk long distances to fetch water. In order to improve this situation, an international organisation decided to build water wells in or closer to the villages. After the wells were built, family conflicts and conflicts between the villages increased. The fact that more conflicts were arising even though the general living conditions had improved took everyone by surprise. There has been no major change in the overall political, economic and social situation and the rules of the use of the water wells were strictly respected by everyone.

The organisation that constructed the water wells conducted a study on this with the following result: As there was formal justice system for people in the area, they had their own mechanisms of conflict resolution: On their way to the water wells, the women solved a lot of problems. As the wells were far away, they had time to discuss, negotiate and advise the parties in conflict. With the construction of the wells in the villages, this space for conflict resolution was taken away and not replaced. On the basis of the results of this study, the organisation decided to establish a network for conflict resolution together with the women and the elders of the concerned villages.

Key issues of WFCS: There was no conflict analysis made before the intervention and there was no analysis of the capacities for peace in this area. Also, an analysis of governance factors was not made, e.g. which institutions and mechanisms exist to solve conflicts.

## CONCEPT AND


PREPARATIONS

## INTRODUCTION

## What is Different in Fragile and Conflict Affected Situations?

Fragile and conflict-affected situations do not require entirely different development programs and projects but they do call for a different approach, which recognises political and security challenges and specific characteristics of fragility. When insecurity prevails, the political, social, economic and cultural environment is unstable and ever changing. Also, harmful divides in society put social cohesion at risk.

This manual introduces the 3-Steps approach for WFCS, to ensure appropriate and timely analysis, decision-making and action, which take the unstable and (potentially) violent context into account.



### FIGURE: The World Bank on citizen security, justice and jobs

On an international level initiatives such as the *World Development Report* 2011 on Conflict, Security, and Development mentions security, justice and jobs as priority areas for engagement.

The Paris Declaration and the 10 Principles for Good International Engagement<sup>1</sup> in fragile situations by OECD-DAC provide a good starting point for development interventions in fragile contexts. The picture below shows OECD-DACs 2011 evaluation of the progress in implementing the principles:

| LEVEL OF IMPLEMENTATION | BROADLY ON-TRACK  | 6. | Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies        |
|-------------------------|-------------------|----|---|
|                         | PARTLY ON-TRACK   | 7. | Align with local priorities in different ways in different con-<br>texts        |
|                         | PARTLY OFF-TRACK  | 1. | Take context as the starting point  |
|                         |                   | 3. | Focus on statebuilding as the central<br>objective                              |
|                         |                   | 4. | Prioritise prevention   |
|                         |                   | 5. | Recognise the links between political, security and devel-<br>opment objectives |
|                         |                   | 2. | Do no harm  |
|                         |                   | 8. | Agree on practical co-ordination mechanisms between international actors        |
|                         |                   | 9. | Act fast but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance                  |
|                         |                   | 10 | Avoid pockets of exclusion  |
|                         | Broadly on-track: |    | ood progress in implementation of the Fragile States Principles                 |
|                         | Partly on-track:  |    | ommitment and some progress in Implementation                                   |
|                         | Partly off-track: |    | ommitment but Implementation is insufficient                                    |
|                         | Off-track:        | LI | nited commitment and poor to non-existent Implementation                        |

Subsequent studies and discussion in the follow-up meetings in Accra and in Busan<sup>2</sup> have pointed out that the Millenium Development Goals (MDGs) do not adequately take into account the specific needs of fragile situations. Evaluations of the implementation of the Paris Declaration have underlined the numerous lessons learned for engagement in fragile and conflict-affected situations<sup>3</sup>. Also, the renewed acknowledgement of the need to tailored approaches to fragile and conflict-affected countries and situations, is illustrated by the following facts<sup>4</sup>:

- 1.5 billion people live in conflict-affected and fragile states
- · About 70% of fragile states have seen conflict since 1989
- · Basic governance transformations may take 20-40 years
- 30% of Official Development Assistance (ODA) is spent in fragile and conflict-affected contexts
- These countries are furthest away from achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)

The G7+, a group of 19 fragile and conflict-affected countries, development partners, and international organisations therefore came together in 2011 in an International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding and drafted the "New Deal", focusing on new ways of collaborating in fragile states.

<sup>2</sup> http://www.g7plus.org/

<sup>4</sup> The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States.

CONCEPT AND

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> OPM/IDL (2008) Evaluation of the Implementation of the Paris Declaration: Thematic Study - The applicability of the Paris Declaration in fragile and conflict-affected situations. An electronic version is available at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/evaluation.asp and http://www.oecd.org/dac/incaf/effectiveengagementinfragilestates.htm

## PREPARATIONS

The New Deal is a multilateral initiative and it remains to be seen how inclusive it will be and how open it will handle civil society participation. However, it represents a commitment to build mutual trust and achieve better results in fragile states and it also formulates 5 Peacebuilding and Statebuilding goals:

- · Legitimate Politics Foster inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution
- Security Establish and strengthen people's security
- Justice Address injustices and increase people's access to justice
- · Economic Foundations Generate employment and improve livelihoods
- Revenues & Services Manage revenue and build capacity for accountable and fair service delivery

In fact, most fragile states are also experiencing high levels of direct or indirect violence. Conflict and fragility fuel each other<sup>5</sup>.

Violent conflict may be a symptom, a consequence and


a cause of fragility<sup>6</sup>.

States that exercise arbitrary or limited authority and do not deliver basic services are generally not perceived as legitimate.

People expect fairness and punish inequality<sup>7</sup>

In these situations (sometimes limited to regions or areas) governments are often seen as perpetrators or absent actors and undermine the (national) social contract and weaken public trust.

When trust is limited to sectors and groups and public grievances are high, polarisation, sectoral violent contestation and conflicts are often the result, which is in turn often met with more state violence. Consequently it can be affirmed that conflict and fragility are indeed highly interdependent<sup>8</sup> and interlinked as the figure below<sup>9</sup> depicts:



#### FIGURE: Spectrum of Peace Interventions

- <sup>5</sup> Source: The "Users' Guide on Measuring Fragility" by German Development Institute
- / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE), United Nation Development Programme (UNDP)
- 6 Ibid
- <sup>7</sup> World Development Report 2011. Conflict, Security and Development. Page 82.
- <sup>8</sup> For definitions of "Fragility", "Violence" and "Conflict", see in this Manual: "How to do a Basic Introduction on Factors of Fragility and Conflict"

Important national and international policy documents:

- 10 principles for good engagement in fragile states and situations (OECD-DAC 2007)
- World Development Report 2011
- New Deal on International Engagement in Fragile States: 5 Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals
- Message on Switzerland's International Cooperation in 2013 2016<sup>10</sup>

### How can the 3-Step approach to WFCS help practitioners?

This manual does not aim to cover all aspects of "fragility" as this is a very broad concept. However, pursuing development work in fragile situations goes in hand with a very real risk of violent conflict. Therefore, the 3-Step approach of working in fragile and conflict-affected situations focuses on aspects of violence and fragility that are relevant to development programs or projects. It promotes a subjective or self-assessing approach and brings to the surface locally relevant governance problems. The aim of the approach is to avoid possible negative impacts for instance by involuntarily exacerbating existing tensions and to foster a positive impact on the fragile and conflict-affected context. As such, it can help identify possible entry points for conflict transformation and peacebuilding strategies and activities.

The WFCS approach should be applied in all fragile and conflict-affected situations:

The 3-Steps approach of Working in Fragile and Conflict Affected Situations (WFCS) is a practical approach tailored for project management in fragile and conflict-affected situations.

## What's the Difference between Sensitivity to Conflict and Fragility and Risk Management?

There are many overlaps between sensitivity to conflict and fragility and risk management. Both require an analysis of the conflict context and an assessment of how the conflict affects the organisation and its programmes. Although both require tailored analysis and - if necessary - quick adjustments to the context, the two concepts can be distinguished by different purposes and target groups:

- Security management, in a sensitive way, aims at ensuring the security of its staff members and partners in order to continue project implementation in the fragile situation.
- Sensitivity to conflict and fragility (WFCS) aims at avoiding negative and strengthening positive impacts of the programme in the fragile context. As a result connecting elements are strengthened and the organisation is able to continue to engage meaningfully in a fragile and conflict-affected situation.
- <sup>9</sup> EU DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION IN FRAGILE STATES: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES. Policy study by the Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union. 2013. Graphic developed by: Bailey, S. and Pavanello, S., 'Untangling early Recovery', Humanitarian Policy Group Policy Brief 28, ODI, London,2009
- <sup>10</sup> http://www.deza.admin.ch/en/Home/News/Close\_up?itemID=208683

## CONCEPT AND

PREPARATIONS

|            | Sensitivity to Conflict and<br>Fragility  | Security Risk Assessment   |
|------------|---|--|
| Purpose    | To avoid negative impact of the<br>programme on the conflict and<br>to ensure the strengthening of<br>capacities for positive change<br>(positive impact).                            | To protect the staff and partners<br>working in a programme and<br>avoid security related incidents.   |
| For Whom   | International and local staff<br>members, stakeholders, part-<br>ners, local communities, the<br>concerned / beneficiaries  | International and local staff of the organisation, implementing partners   |
| Activities | Regular conflict assessment,<br>training, monitoring and<br>reporting, adjustments of the<br>programmes, collaboration<br>and coordination with interna-<br>tional and local partners | Regular conflict assessment,<br>training, monitoring and report-<br>ing, adjusting security guidelines<br>and operating guidelines, coordi-<br>nation with international and local<br>partners |
| Principles | Participation, transparency,<br>accountability, inclusion,<br>impartiality, gender-sensitivity,<br>non-discrimination,  | Participation, coordination,<br>transparency, low profile, gender-<br>sensitivity, non-discrimination  |

## WFCS and Peacebuilding

The 3-Steps of working in fragile and conflict-affected situations should be applied in fragile situations and where tensions or conflicts prevail. While the organisation continues to focus on its working areas (e.g. poverty reduction, education, and infrastructure) as stated in the mandate and strategies, the WFCS approach ensures that negative impacts are reduced and positive potentials are strengthened. Peace building interventions aim directly at reducing the key drivers of conflicts and tensions. They directly address the conflict and seek to transform it. However, experience has shown, that peacebuilding projects are not necessarily sensitive only because they aim at reducing conflict drivers. Some interactions of the project with the conflict context might have a negative impact despite the good intentions. Therefore a sensitive approach also needs to be applied to peacebuilding projects.

## BASIC CONSIDERATIONS (FOR FACILITATORS)

3-STEPS FOR WORKING IN FRAGILE AND CONFLICT-AFFECTED SITUATIONS (WFCS)




FIGURE: 3-Steps for Working in Fragile and Conflict affected Situations

Kompetenzzentrum Friedensförderung Centre pour la promotion de la paix Centro per la promozione della pace Center for Peacebuilding







13

## CONCEPT AND

PREPARATIONS

## THE 3-STEPS IN A NUTSHELL

## STEP 1:

## Understanding the conflict context

An organisation working in fragile and conflict-affected situations is part of the context. It's representatives should understand the actors related to conflict and fragility, tensions and the conflict-related events and have a basic understanding of the related governance and fragility issues. The conflict-context analysis focuses on factors, which can reduce or increase tensions. It looks at key actors, Sources of Tensions (SOT), Connecting Elements (CE) as well as key questions on (local) governance. The scope and depth of the conflict-context analysis depend on its aim, use and the context in which it is conducted.

→ Outcome of step 1: Matrix of key factors of conflict and fragility

## STEP 2:

## Understanding the interaction between the organisation and the conflict context

What is the interaction between the identified elements of conflict and fragility and the project/programme, i.e. between the programme, the organisation and their relations with partners and stakeholders? A list of sample questions regarding these elements helps to identify relevant factors in the programme, which create tensions or have a positive impact on the conflict context. They are often related to information sharing / communication, the transfer of resources and whatever implicit messages we send with different types of every-day behaviour.

→ Outcome of step 2: List of interactions between context and project

## STEP 3:

#### Strategic decisions for program and project management

Based on the factors which are creating tensions or are having a positive impact on the conflict context that have been identified, strategic management choices have to be developed. The three fields of observation - programme, organisation and relations – need to be considered. Adjustments of the projects to the conflict context have to become part of the programme management cycle.

| OVERVIEW OF THE THREE   | STEPS  |   |   |             |
|---|--|---|---|-------------|
|   | Content  | Methodology                             | Outcome   | Time needed |
| Basic Introduction  | Key factors of conflict and fragility<br>Intercultural communication | Workshop/Training                       | Basic understanding of key concepts               | ½ - 1 day   |
| Country Strategy and Program level                                      | Guidance on how to include on-                                       | Desk studies and                        | Strategic decisions                               |             |
| Analysis  | going reflections on conflict and                                    | consultations with                      |   |             |
|   | fragility in the country strategy<br>and strategic decisions.        | local stakeholders                      |   |             |
| Step 1: Conflict Context Analysis*                                      |  | Workshop with 15-20<br>persons          |   | 1 -2 days   |
| Session 1:Define the challenge: what are tensions or violence all about | Define the focus of the analysis                                     | Plenary/Groups                          | Common understanding of the focus of the analysis |             |
| Session 2. Identify actors (Actors                                      | Identify the actors of conflict                                      | Plenary/Groups                          | Conflict actors map: Overview                     | 1 hour      |
| Mapping)  |  |   | of the most important actors of conflict          |             |
| Session 3: Identify SOT (Sources  | SOT / CE   | Plenary/Groups                          | Shared recorded understanding                     | 2 hours     |
| of Tension) and CE (Connecting  |  |   | of the main sources and tensions                  |             |
| Elements)   |  |   | and available connecting elemets                  |             |
| Session 4: Key governance prob-   | Governance issues relevant to  | Plenary/Groups                          | Ranked key governance issues-                     | 60 Min      |
| lems for conflict and fragility   | fragility (checklist)  |   | for conflict and fragility                        |             |
| Session 5: Conflict and fragility<br>Matrix                             | Summarise the findings in the Matrix                                 | Plenary/Groups                          | FORMAT: Conflict and fragility<br>Matrix          | 60 Min      |
| Session 6: Scenario Building  | Discuss short-, mid- and long-<br>term scenarios                     | Plenary/Groups                          | Scenarios   | 60 Min      |
| Step 2: Interaction Program -   |  |   |   | ¾ - 1 day   |
| Context   |  |   |   |             |
| Introduction to the main categories                                     | Introduce the examples   | Workshop, small                         |   |             |
| of interactions   |  | discussion group or use it as checklist |   |             |
| Guiding Questions   | Use it as a checklist  | "                                       | FORMAT: Checklist 2a & 2b                         |             |
| Step 3: Strategic choices   |  |   |   | ½ - 1 day   |
| Creativity exercise   | Open up mind/out of the box thinking                                 | Plenary/Groups                          | Game  |             |
| Summary   | Summarise Step 1&2   | "                                       | Overview  |             |
| Take strategic decisions  | Develop measures/options for   | Workshop, small                         | FORMAT: Measures/options                          |             |
| -   | management and implementa-   | discussion group                        |   |             |
|   | tion level and test them against                                     |   |   |             |
|   | conflict context analysis.   |   |   |             |
| Integration into PCM/LogFrame   | WFCS integration into project  | "                                       | FORMAT: Integration of conflict                   |             |
| Never forget  | Concluding reflections   | "                                       | and fragility in the Logframe                     |             |
|   |  |   |   |             |

\*If participants have NO previous exposure and experience with Conflict Sensitivity or Do No Harm: a preliminary basic Introduction is necessary (1/2-1 day)

The time reserved refers to the first assessment of a program or project, subsequent updates and monitoring may require considerably less time.

PREPARATIONS

## STAKEHOLDERS INVOLVED IN THE DIFFERENT STEPS

Many different stakeholders are involved in the application of the 3 steps to working in fragile and conflict-affected situations. Three key roles are those of the:

- Program/project manager
- Implementer
- Facilitator

The illustration below indicates who should take the different steps to ensure sensitivity to conflict and fragility.

## STEP 1:

At the level of the conflict context analysis, it is crucial to invite a wideranging group of stakeholders, particularly local stakeholders. The involvement of beneficiaries of the intervention is extremely helpful in order to get an in-depth and broad-based analysis, and to learn about experiences and sensitive issues in the field. The ownership of stakeholders will increase if they are invited to contribute at this stage.

## STEP 2:

The interactions between the organisation and the context are further analysed together with the most relevant stakeholders and those who are directly involved in the implementation on the ground.

## STEP 3:

This step is about decision-making and possible (re-)adjustments of the programme to the context. The management of the programme must be included at this stage even though decisions may affect all stakeholders, including beneficiaries. Therefore it is important to regularly cross-check the conflict context analysis with all relevant stakeholders, get feedback on the adjustments and to be up to date on changes in the immediate contexts



FIGURE: Stakeholders involved in the different steps

## **RECOMMENDATIONS & ADVISE FOR PREPARATION**

To conduct the conflict context analysis in a participatory and gender sensitive manner, it is important to select a good number of women and men, normally between 15 and 20 people.

Regarding the composition, participants usually are mostly staff, but should also include persons other stakeholders. Depending on the context, the latter may be implementing partners, local stakeholders, local authorities as well as representatives of the concerned.

#### General recommendations for programme and project managers

- 1. Be sure that the meaning of "conflict context analysis" and the reason why it is done is understood in your program/project.
- 2. Be aware that the conflict context analysis has, ipso facto, an impact on the environment, i.e. through the subsequent actions of those involved in the analysis.
- 3. Make sure that the managing staff of the programme/project is involved in the conflict context analysis and that the analysis is done in an inclusive way, i.e. with the participation of the programme and the financial, national and international staff. Projects and programmes should aim to reach equitable outcomes for women and men. Also, try to raise gendersensitive concerns in a culture-sensitive way.
- 4. Allocate sufficient time for the Step 1 analysis: At least one working day in the planning phase of a programme; subsequent updates might be less time consuming if done regularly.
- 5. Be flexible in terms of the frequency of the conflict context analysis, depending on the volatility of the context; promote the continuity of the exercise in terms of topics, participation and approach.
- 6. Insist that whenever possible, the conflict context analysis is documented in an operational, concise way, possibly including a written summary and the CONFLICT AND FRAGILITY MATRIX (*cf. Annex 5*). However, be aware that there are exceptional circumstances, where it is too dangerous to put the analysis in written form.

0

#### General recommendations for facilitators and field staff

- 7. Keep in mind that the conflict context analysis is an intervention that has to be done in a conflict sensitive way, i.e. avoid doing harm.
- 8. Note that in some contexts, it may be sensitive to document a conflict context analysis. For such situations, creative ways to still do the exercise can be found (e.g. use of pseudonyms)
- 9. Select a convenient place where the conflict context analysis can be done, i.e. preferably close to the place(s) of implementation.
- 10. Insist on the specific features of the conflict context analysis that focus on factors that divide women and men or are sources of tensions, as well as factors that connect people or are sources for positive change in a fragile situation
- 11. Be aware and make sure that the conflict context analysis is not a static snapshot, i.e. a list of factors, but factors that are related to each other. Make the interdependence and interrelations between the different factors explicit, i.e. get an overall view and understanding of the conflict environment. The dynamics of conflicts matter!

## CONCEPT AND

## PREPARATIONS

Conflict context and fragility analysis is crucial for designing, planning, implementing and evaluating projects / programmes. Such an analysis should be an integral part of the project cycle management.

WFCS approach to the conflict context and fragility analysis: The approach of this manual is to focus on the perceived fragility and conflict situation as a starting point, and to use macro-data to complement perceptions and for triangulation (see ANNEX 17 und 18 for additional data sources).

An organisation is always part of the context and as a result it affects it in intended and unintended ways. Therefore it is crucial that an organisation analyses the context well and acts based on that analysis. See the links to a list of analytical tools complementary to this manual in ANNEX: 22, more conflict context analysis tools: PEA, Governance Assessment, Power Analysis.

#### **Conflict Context Analysis**

Sustainable development in fragile and conflict-affected contexts is only possible if interventions in this area respond to the specific aspects of this context. Each programme is automatically part of the context, i.e. a development organisation has an impact on the context and vice versa if it is working in a fragile situation. Therefore, development organisations need to constantly position and question themselves in relation to fragility and conflict-related factors and changes. It is crucial for development organisations to make local knowledge and perceptions explicit and to ensure that they are fed into programme planning and implementation.

The aim of the analysis is to integrate the conflict and fragility lens in development organisations' PCM. Conflict context analysis broadens the understanding of the context by adding a specific focus on factors that amplify or reduce tensions. The conflict context analysis enables development organisations to find entry points for their interventions in the planning phase of their programmes. Furthermore it enables them to adjust their programmes to the changing needs of the fragile and conflict-affected situation. The depth of analysis depends on the situation.

#### **Different Depths of Analysis**

- · Tensions and connecting or mitigating factors exist in every society. In fragile situations, characterised by the absence or low levels of rule of law and accountability, as well as corruption and little state capacity / effectiveness, the question is how a society deals with tensions. It is important to be aware and informed about this even if there is no recent history of violent conflict.
- · If a situation is complex, fragile and violent, it is necessary to get in-depth knowledge. To be able to understand the complexity of the situation or to address the conflict, more elements need to be analysed. A conflict context analysis focuses on the specific elements that may cause, trigger or exacerbate conflicts. This may include a range of political, socio-economic, historical and other factors, focusing on the ones that directly influence the shape and dynamics of the conflict.

#### Actors and stakeholders: Who conducts the conflict context analysis?

National and international programme / project staff including the management, the programme officers and finance officers should conduct the conflict context analysis.

It is important to consider and to include the complementary local, national and international perspectives of the fragile situation. These views might differ, but they complement each other and can contribute to a more comprehensive analysis of the context and a mutual understanding of the different points of view. Further, in order to promote the links between staff working in operations and finance, it makes sense to include finance staff in some parts of the analysis and decisions (see Public Audits and Downward Accountability in the Links in ANNEX 22).

The list of participants should be made in a gender-sensitive way, i.e. men and women should participate and express their specific views. Indeed, men and women often have a different understanding and assessment of the conflict or the security situation. The latter affects them in different ways and men and women often react to it differently. Therefore, gender considerations are a must!



 $\vdash$ 

Ē

#### The benefits of explicit and recorded conflict context analysis

Usually the local staff members on the ground and partners have an indepth knowledge and very good capacity to analyse changes related to the conflict context. They constantly assess their own context. Additional written information, reports and security briefings complement this knowledge. To use this knowledge for planning, it is necessary to make it explicit (if the security situation allows this). Such analysis should be done on a regular basis. It should also be recorded in writing and shared with the program management and headquarters in order to ensure flexible, rapid and effective decision making if required.

#### Timing and frequency of applying the 3-Step Approach

The conflict context analysis is the first step and prerequisite for any program in a fragile context. Therefore, it is part of the design and planning phase of a programme. Also, the CONFLICT AND FRAGILITY MATRIX and a comment on the consequences of the analysis should be included in reporting exercises and should be updated at key moments of the project cycle management.

Moreover, in a dynamic conflict context or a tense situation, it makes sense to regularly update the conflict context analysis; The frequency depends on a series of criteria, such as:

- Stage of the conflict
- Volatility of the situation
- · Intensity of the conflict
- · Safety and security concerns

It is of crucial importance to react to sudden changes of the environment by conducting or updating conflict context analysis.

#### Stages of conflict<sup>11</sup>:

According to the Heidelberg Institute of International Conflict Research (HIIK)<sup>12</sup> it is useful do differentiate between disputes as political conflicts carried out without resorting to violence or non-violent crisis with the threat of violence on one hand and violent conflicts on the other hand. Violent crisis, limited war and war constitute the category of violent conflicts, categorized according to intensity, frequency as well as impact.

These categories reflect the "fragility" discussion, mainly in the missing or contested monopoly of force or lacking authority and legitimacy by the state. Under such circumstances, governments are often seen as perpetrators or absent actors, causing greed or grievances for elites and various population groups in the society. In the long run, these grievances add to the risk of political instability and violent conflict.

Many internal conflicts last for many years and move in a circular direction between these different stages of conflict.

- <sup>12</sup> Dynamic Model of Conflicts, Heidelberg Institute of International Conflict Research:
  - http://hiik.de/en/methodik/index.html



## CONCEPT AND

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> More on fragility and conflict in "How to do a prepare the ground for the 3-Steps exercise (for Facilitators)"

PREPARATIONS

#### **Focus and location**

Conflict context assessments need to respect all perspectives, including the local ones, where national level sources of tension or root causes of conflict appear in a variety of different and often unexpected ways. Therefore, it is recommended to combine the international, national, regional and local perspectives, in line with the focus, priorities and capabilities of the programme / project.

While keeping the geographical focus of the conflict context analysis in mind, it is particularly important to give a voice to local stakeholders.

#### Sharing and dissemination of information

Obviously, it makes sense to share the conflict context analysis with relevant stakeholders within the organisation (i.e. local to head office) of the programme/project. Different views might enrich internal discussions. Also, the programme/project should consider sharing its conflict context analysis with other stakeholders (at least partially in very sensitive contexts), such as bi- or multilateral donor organisations or other NGOs. This coordination can foster common understanding, better coordination and fine-tuning, i.e. it is a tool for creating synergies and alliances.

Open for discussion, but not necessarily excluded, is the choice whether a conflict context analysis can be shared with a party of the conflict. This might be required for security considerations. However, principles such as neutrality, impartiality and independence should be considered. Depending on the specific characteristics of the conflict, this sharing might be a necessity, or an altogether impossible step.

- Sharing the conflict context analysis: If the conflict context analysis is shared with one party of the conflict, this is likely to be perceived by the other parties of the conflict as a violation of the principles of neutrality and independence. Also, this unequal sharing of the conflict context analysis might endanger the safety and security of staff and even the entire program/project.
- The sources of information, that the conflict context analysis is based on, should be carefully checked, keeping in mind that (especially during violent conflicts), the risk of manipulation and distortion of information is high.
- Language is often a crucial and sensitive issue as it determines who can read certain reports/manuals, what is translated, who does the translation and who gets a translation. It is useful to consider translating the conflict context analysis into a local language(s). The use of words and their precise understanding, influences the perception others may have of the conflict. Therefore, the terms used must be clarified and local meanings and perceptions crosschecked.

#### Conflict sensitive conflict context analysis

The elaboration of a conflict context analysis automatically has an impact on the environment, i.e. the conflict. This activity should be considered as an intervention itself. Defining Sources of Tensions (SOT) and Connecting Elements (CE) in a fragile situation is also a political or sensitive act. Therefore it can either promote peace or foster tensions and conflicts. Therefore, the conflict context analysis has to be done in a conflict sensitive way.

#### Conflict sensitive facilitation

The facilitator confirms the appropriate use of words with participants and decides which issues will be discussed in depth. His or her decision depends on:

- · The conflict context
- · The development organisation's present situation
- · The development organisation's mandate and assignment
- The needs or precautions of staff members, partners, programs and stakeholders
- · Previous discussions

The facilitator of the discussion should take into account that local staff members may have personal traumas, i.e. themselves or their families may have been directly affected personally by the fragile or conflict situation. Local staff should have a good knowledge of the local perception towards the programme and of the target groups and stakeholders. It is also important to bear in mind that staff members might belong to one of the conflicting parties or opposite groups.

## Gender sensitive conflict context analysis<sup>13</sup>

Women are affected differently by conflict than men. A gender-sensitive conflict context analysis assesses how gender relations shape the ways women and men engage in, are affected by, and seek to resolve conflict. Some gender-related aspects to consider are:

- Gender relations, however profoundly unjust, are rarely the root cause of violent social conflict.
- Gender based injustices against women or men can sometimes be a catalyst for conflict. For instance, systematic abuse of women by men can trigger violent defensive reactions.
- Gender based injustices are one of the most significant manifestations of conflict. The systematic use of rape and other forms of sexual violence as a means of conducting war has been observed in many conflicts and appears to be on the increase, notably in genocidal conflicts in the Balkans, in Rwanda and Burundi and in Darfur, Sudan.<sup>14</sup>

Analytical Frameworks on Gender in Conflict<sup>15</sup> The most common analytical frameworks used for gender analysis in conflict situations often rely on two interrelated concepts<sup>16</sup>

- 1 Gender analysis in different stages of conflict
  - Before armed violence breaks out
  - In times of war and repression
  - In post-war periods (and during peacemaking processes)
- 2 Analysis of the different experiences needs and interests women and men may have as social actors in conflicts. This approach refers to the gendered division of labour and the analysis of gender roles (reproductive, productive, community-managing and political roles)

In addition, the conflict context analysis should be open to consider the perspectives of different stakeholders (who are working at different levels and tracks<sup>17</sup>), such as diplomats, the local government, local civil society groups, the media, or insurgent/rebel groups.

## CONCEPT AND

### PREPARATIONS

For program/country level analysis and decision making see the PCM

sections as well as ANNEX 6

0

Ê

In the analysis, some SOTs and CEs should have a specific gender dimension.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> See also your organisations' Gender Policy.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> UNIFEM Policy Briefing Paper (2006) 'Gender and Conflict Analysis'

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> SDC Factsheet, Gender and Peacebuilding, June 2009.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> CIDA (Canadian International Development Cooperation) developed table (2001) 'Elements of conflict situations and possible gender dimensions'.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> See the Glossary on "tracks".



## KEY CONCEPTS (FOR FACILITATORS)

This section briefly introduces necessary key concepts and definitions for people who intend to introduce the topic in a workshop or facilitate the application of the 3-Steps approach.

As a facilitator, before starting with the practical 3-Steps guide to working in fragile and conflict-affected situations, it may be helpful to have the most important definitions of conflict, violence, peace, peacebuilding and fragility at hand.

Aid organisations have different approaches to dealing with the analysis of conflict and fragility. Very often, collaborators think that they do know the context well enough and are aware of all the relevant facts. Almost always though, creating a platform to discuss difficult issues and doing systematic analysis is a huge eye-opener and changes perceptions considerably. Some country programmes decide to contract specialised organisations or experts to conduct country-wide conflict context analysis (e.g. for the strategy) or regional conflict context analyses. Other programs in highly conflictive situations collaborate with specialised organisations for on-going conflict context analysis, making this a part of the project. These analyses are considered very helpful to gain a detailed understanding of the conflict-situation.

External conflict context analysis is a great support, but it should complement rather than replace on-going, project specific conflict context analysis. It is crucial that the capacities of conflict context assessment are rooted in the teams and conflict context analysis becomes an organic way of looking at the complex realities.

## EXAMPLE

In Afghanistan HELVETAS Swiss Intercooperation has field-based offices that maintain very close relations with local stakeholders, which gives them a good understanding of the ever changing context. In some areas the NGO works with a local partner organisation specialised in conflict context analysis and experienced in conflict resolution. In other areas, it invested in a one-off detailed conflict context analysis conducted by yet another specialised agency. This analysis provided useful guidance to the team as it contained specific and detailed knowledge on the context and complemented the ongoing 3-Step processs.

#### Conflict

"Is a relationship between two or more parties (individual or groups) who have, or think they have, incompatible goals, values, interests or claims to status, power or scarce resources. (...) Conflicts are a fact of life, inevitable and often creative. Conflicts are usually resolved peacefully and often lead to an improved situation for most or all of those involved" (Chris Mitchell, 1981).

There are different types of conflict. A conflict can arise abruptly and be the result of simple misunderstandings that can be addressed through improved communication, i.e. surface conflict. Contrarily, an open conflict is very visible and often has deep roots in society. A latent conflict is less visible and cannot be addressed while it is still under the surface. The causes and dynamics of conflict are very different and as illustrated on p. 21, the conflicts may change rapidly from one type to the other, i.e. a latent conflict can turn into an open conflict, etc.

CONCEPT AND

PREPARATIONS



Do No Harm and the 3-Step Manual: Some aspects of the Do No Harm Analysis are part of the 3-Steps approach and many insights rely upon the initial findings of the Do No Harm approach. Other components are new.

## PREPARATIONS

A conflict becomes violent when channels for communication are missing or inadequate, dissenting voices and felt grievances aren't heard and addressed, and the wider community or society is characterised by instability, injustice and fear.

#### Violence

Violence consists of actions, words, attitudes, structures or systems that cause physical, psychological, social or environmental damage, and/or prevent women and men from reaching their human potential.<sup>18</sup>

The illustration below categorises different types of violence. Direct violence is visible and refers to physical violence exercised by humans directly against each other. Structural violence is not visible but causes human suffering through socioeconomic and political conditions. Similarly, cultural violence is not visible. It refers to socio-cultural or political legitimisation of direct and structural violence.

|           | Direct violence   |                     |
|-----------|-------------------|---------------------|
| visible   |                   |                     |
| invisible |                   |                     |
|           | Cultural violence | Structural violence |

## Violent Conflict<sup>19</sup>

Based on a combination of the definitions above, violent conflict is:

- 1. an action which is non-cooperative, destructive, widespread and persistent
- 2. violations or capture of property rights over assets, persons, or institutions
- 3. instigated through some degree of group (versus individual) activity

## Examples of different forms of violence and conflict<sup>20</sup>:

- · Local intergroup conflict
- "Conventional" political conflict (contests for state power, for autonomy or independence)
- · Widespread gang related violence
- · Organized crime or trafficking with accompanying violence
- · Local conflicts with transnational ideological connections

For examples by country see Annex 15

## $\mathcal{A}$

#### Peace

Peace does not mean the absence of conflicts, as conflicts are part of life. It is often defined as the situation in which conflict is managed by a society through the involvement of all parties and guided by the principles of equality and mutual respect. It leads to settlements accepted by all parties.

#### Peacebuilding

This term refers to a wide range of activities and measures in an emerging, current or post-conflict situation that have as the main objective / mandate to address key driving issues of conflict and to prevent violent conflict and create conditions for sustainable, peaceful and just development.

<sup>18</sup> Galtung, Johan. "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research" Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 6, No. 3 (1969), pp. 167-191

- <sup>19</sup> Source: Tilman Brück und Kati Schindler. "The impact of Conflict and Fragility on Households: A Conceptual Framework with Reference to Widows." 2008. UNU-WIDER, Research Paper No. 2008/83.
- <sup>20</sup> See: World Development report 2011, page 54.

#### Fragility:

In line with the DIE<sup>21</sup> we consider statehood or on the contrary "fragility" as manifest in three areas: (in-)effectiveness of state functions, authority over use of force, and legitimacy. The more a state provides goods and services to its citizens (effectiveness), the more it enforces a legimate monopoly of the use of force (authority) and the more it allows for civil and political rights and is accepted by the people as legitimate (legitimacy), then the more stable and functioning (adapted from Fabra Mata/Ziaja, 2009, Chesterman, Ignatieff/Thakur 2005, Ignatieff 2004, Rotberg 2004). Considerable deficits in these areas may lead to a fragile situation.

Numerous studies also point to the important aspect of state-society relationships. Obviously the three state functions are interdependent, and each of them represents one distinct form of state-society relations, which lies at the centre of our interest. State-society relationships and relationships between different groups is also recognized as a crucial topic for conflict and fragility by the WB and UNDP, which are both emphasizing social cohesion.




FIGURE: Adapted from Call (2010) in: "State Fragility: Towards a Multi-Dimensional Empirical Typology". DIE, Discussion Paper 3/2012

0

To get assess a country or a situation, check *ANNEX 14* and look at the different indices on fragility (*ANNEX 18*) to get an overview of countries' ratings, define legitimacy and effectiveness score in the matrix above.

## Fragility and Governance:

With the prominence of the fragility concept came a new wave of documents on the relationship between fragility (conflict) and governance<sup>22</sup>. Although practitioners have long discussed the link between fragility/conflict and governance, so far it has been difficult to prove a clear causal relationship between the two. However, it is clear that states with little service provision and

## CONCEPT AND

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> State fragility: towards a multi-dimensional empirical typology. Jörn Grävingholt, Sebastian Ziaja, Merle Kreibaum. Discussion Paper / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik. Bonn 2012.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> GOVERNANCE FOR PEACE: Securing the social contract. UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery Bureau for Development Policy. 2012. RE-THINKING APPROACHES TO LOCAL GOVERNANCE PROGRAMMING IN CONFLICT AFFECTED COUNTRIES IN THE ARAB REGION. An exploratory study. UNDP: May 2010. FRAGILITY AND CONFLICTS. Marta Reynal-Querol, ERD Team member, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. 2009. LOCAL GOVERNANCE, PEACE BUILDING AND STATE BUILDING IN POST-CONFLICT SETTINGS. UNDP Discussion Paper: http://uncdf.org/gfld/docs/post-conflict.pdf. EU DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION IN FRAGILE STATES: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES. Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union. 2013. GOVERNANCE MEASUREMENTS FOR CONFLICT AND FRAGILTY, a comparative inventory. UNDP. 2012


## PREPARATIONS

little legitimacy are less able to mitigate risks and provide safety and security for all citizens. It is therefore safe to state that:

"Legitimate governance processes and institutions are key mediators of social conduct, and thus central to any effort to address the structural causes of conflict and the triggers of violence"<sup>23</sup>.

When looking at local governance programming in fragile or conflict-affected situations, it seems striking that governance is mainly seen as a technical issue and less in the sense of a process based on an inclusive national and sub-national vision. A recent UNDP<sup>24</sup> study identified major tension fields in governance programming in fragile and conflict-affected situations. First there is a tension field between "local" versus "national" legitimacy, as in conflict contexts, typically there are numerous state and non-state actors, which compete with the state for legitimacy or even have a stronger basis for legitimacy. Gender considerations need to be enhanced as the roles and responsibilities of men and women in a conflict context change quickly. Accountability is one of the key issues to create trust at the local level and needs to be prioritized over increased efficiency of service delivery, otherwise there is a danger of corruption and parallel systems, delegitimizing state services. Finally it is necessary to differentiate between the support to local government and local governance. A broader governance model may need more in-depth understanding of the different actors, their relationships as well as structures and processes that have the potential to shape inclusive and equitable relationships between government as well as local citizens and their organisations.

Although the different studies on conflict/fragility and (local) governance focus on various regions and issues, similar topics are mentioned universally. The quality of institutions is found to be one of the most important variables for the outbreak of violence. At the same time weak or unwilling institutions coupled with high ethnic polarisation significantly reduces a countries' resilience to violent conflict. The current popularity of the concept of social cohesion or social contract points to increasing emphasis on the relationship between government and citizens and among them. As the UNDP paper on "Governance for Peace" points out, assistance in fragile and conflict-affected situations will fail, "if the immediate needs and complex state-society relations that characterize fragile and conflict-affected societies<sup>25</sup>" are not fully understood and taken into account.



<sup>23</sup>Governance in Conflict Prevention and Recovery: A Guidance Note. UNDP 2009.
 <sup>24</sup>RE-THINKING APPROACHES TO LOCAL GOVERNANCE PROGRAMMING IN CON-

FLICT AFFECTED COUNTRIES IN THE ARAB REGION. An exploratory study. UNDP: May 2010.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup>GOVERNANCE FOR PEACE: Securing the social contract. UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery Bureau for Development Policy. 2012. p. 11.

## FRAGILITY AND CONFLICT<sup>26</sup>

The main issues of fragility are effectiveness/capacity of the state, its legitimacy as perceived by the citizens and legitimate authority of the use of force or security. Where these core functions of the state are not in place and where violent conflict occurs two driving forces - sometimes referred to as "realities" - can normally be found: **Sources of Tensions (SOT)/DI-VIDERS and Connecting Elements (CE)**. There are elements in societies, which *divide* women and men from each other and function as *sources of tension*. There are also *always* elements, which *connect* people, facilitate non-violence and can function as *connecting elements*.

Understanding what divides women and men and where tensions come from is critical to understanding how interventions can increase or lessen these tensions.

Understanding what possibilities there are for improvements despite conflict helps organisations to understand how interventions reinforce or undermine those factors that can mitigate conflict or become positive forces for stability and non-violence in society.

Conflict-context analysis prompts us to analyse the situation. In order to do that, we first need to know the *facts*. Questions for which we have to find answers are: In this particular situation, what are women and men doing? What exactly divides people or what exactly are sources of tension between them? What are the things which work towards positive change or potentially connect them?

It is important to be very specific.

In the conflict situation, ALWAYS ASK: what are women and men doing?

### A. Actors relevant for fragility and conflict

In a fragile situation, trust is often lacking. People feel insecure or threatened, because they feel left alone with their problems, no state is protecting them or they are not heard or are even oppressed by an authoritarian state. Typically, in these situations no state is mediating between different interests and competing groups, trying to find solutions and acting on behalf of its citizens. Sometimes state representatives even take advantage of the situation for its own benefit. Hence, in fragile situations, it is often difficult to understand the dynamics between existing groups and other actors who play different roles. When clear roles are lacking and authority is contested, it is a first and crucial step to get a clear picture of the different groups and actors in a certain situation as well as to understand the relationships between them.

## B. Two realities: Sources of Tensions (SOT) and Connecting Elements (CE)

When discussing the two realities, one may say that something is a Source of Tension (SOT). What makes it a SOT? How does it divide people? Why is it important? What does one actually know about it? If one thinks something is a source of tension, ask: how is it fuelling tension? Why is it important? What is the factor that divides people? "Religion" is often called a divider. Yet "religion" itself, while perhaps having different meanings for the different groups (e.g. Christians and Muslims or different sub-groups of Islam), is often not itself the source of tension. The question is: How do people use religion?

CONCEPT AND

## PREPARATIONS

Sample sources of tensions and connecting elements: VALUES, INSTITUTIONS, COMMON EXPERIENCES, TRADITIONS or STRUCTURES.

## PREPARATIONS

When discussing the two realities, one may say something is a Connecting Element (CE). How does one know? How does it connect people and instigate positive change? Why is it important? What does one actually know about it? What are people doing?

Similarly, connecting elements should not be romanticized or over generalized. "Women" or "women's groups" are often identified as CEs, as are "economic interests" or "infrastructure". While in some places women reach across conflict lines, in others women insist on revenge for their loved ones' suffering. Infrastructure or natural resources (such as a river) may connect people physically, but may be used in ways that create tension.

## C. Sources of Tensions (SOT) and Connecting Elements (CE) are not individual people

As CDA has been pointing out in many reflections on Do No Harm, people are individuals often acting as members of a group but they have different and shifting interests and priorities. They have opinions and their experiences and do all kind of different things for various reasons. Basically <u>whatever</u> men and women talk about, think about and most important what they DO are **SOT** and **CE**. There are no SOT or CE without women and men actually doing something.

## 66 Often people like Nelson Mandela are considered as

### Connecting Element

Nelson Mandela has certainly become a symbol and as a symbol has been used as a CE to promote peace. Nelson Mandela, the person, has in fact become quite adept at using his symbolic presence. However, as a person, he is not a CE.

By identifying a person as a SOT or CE, it becomes difficult to respond to that person's behaviour. We know that warriors can become peacemakers, guerrillas can become farmers, and politicians can become environmentalists. Peace occurs because women and men change their behaviour. If we label people, we interpret their behaviour through that label and we may miss changes that signal opportunity. Groups and conflict actors can act as SOTs or CEs. Hence:

## If The Taliban may be both a SOT and a CE

The Taliban do many things, some of which are SOT and but some are also CE. They are for example widely perceived as not corrupt and bringing justice to Afghanistan, by imposing some order.

Indeed, working in a situation where armed opposition groups are operating is difficult and creates a lot of questions and dilemmas. The challenge of working in a situation where an organisation such as the Taliban or Hamas (or any armed actors) are operating, is how to do our work in a way so that, first, we avoid supporting the SOT and, second, we support CE in such an environment without also supporting or being seen to support the Taliban's or Hamas' agenda. This is not easy!

## D. Governance factors in fragile and conflict-affected situations

The three main aspects of fragility are state (in-)effectiveness, legitimacy as well as state authority. Effectiveness is the ability or functionality of a state to provide sufficient goods and services to its citizens. Legitimacy refers to the states' acceptance by its people as well as the guarantee of political rights and civil liberties. Authority is the ability to enforce a <u>legitimate</u> monopoly on the use of force. The more of all the three features it has, the more stable and functioning a state it is.

One of the key mechanisms in which principles of good governance - such as accountability, transparency, participation, non-discrimination and inclusion – are playing out are <u>the State-Citizen relationships</u>.

The following framework provides a starting point for discussing governance issues in fragile or conflict-affected situations.

Since the relationship between citizens and the state has proven to be a crucial factor for many governance problems, the 3-Step approach concentrates on these factors. They are later formulated as a <u>list of questions</u> to determine the most important governance factors in an area. The analysis suggested in the checklist is based on assessments of women's and men's perceptions more than objective data. Therefore, the use of indexes to complement the analysis is recommended.

The list of questions as in Step 1 Session 4 serves either for monitoring or the definition of entry points for dialogue/discussion/intervention on governance in conflict situations and it is an important tool to stimulate discussions about the roles of duty bearers as well as rights holders (as in HRBA) in their respective contexts.

### E. Governance framework for fragile and conflict affected situations

| Good governance<br>(special Focus on institutions responsible for security,<br>justice and development) |                               |  |  |
|---|-------------------------------|--|--|
| Ruling Justly   | Governance effective-<br>ness | Legitimacy/Relationship                        |  |
| Security  | Public financial mgmt         | Voice and accountability                       |  |
| National reconciliation   | Corruption                    | Legitimacy and trust of citizens towards state |  |
| Transitional justice  | Decentralisation              | Freedom of expression and media                |  |
| Human right   | Public services               | Inclusiveness                                  |  |
| Shared vision of good governance  |                               | Capability of citizens to organize             |  |

 TABLE: Governance framework for fragile and conflict affected situations

 Adapted from JGA in Rwanda, DFID paper March 2010

CONCEPT AND

PREPARATIONS

### Definitions: Key factors of fragility and conflict<sup>27</sup>

**(Conflict) Actors:** Those individuals or groups who have the capacity to influence for or against peace, to undermine support, to actively promote peace or block it or deliberately perpetrate violence

**Connecting Elements (CE):** Elements in societies, which connect people, facilitate non-violent dispute resolution and can facilitate transformative processes.

**Sources of Tensions (SOT):** Elements in societies which divide people from each other and create tensions

**Governance problems:** Factors of governance and fragility, based on the above concept of fragility and analysed by a self-assessing approach, to trace locally relevant governance problems relevant for programs / projects.

<sup>27</sup> See also, CDA, Do No Harm: http://www.cdainc.com/cdawww/project\_profile. php?pid=DNH&pname=Do%20No%20Harm





## CONFLICT CONTEXT ANALYSIS

## SESSION 1: DEFINE THE CHALLENGE

What tensions or violence are we talking about?

## Instruction for facilitator

- 1. Collect information of current major conflicts/tensions/crisis in the project area along the following questions:
  - · What are current conflicts/tensions/crisis in your project area?
  - · Identify the intensity (low, medium, high) and probability for escalation (when and how often) for each conflicts/tensions/crisis
  - · After having identified all possible conflicts, make a choice of the most serious conflicts (only use them for the following more detailed analysis).

| Relevant conflicts in the | Intensity/impact    | Probability of escalation |
|---------------------------|---------------------|---------------------------|
| project region            | (low, medium, high) | (low, medium, high)       |
|                           |                     |                           |
|                           |                     |                           |
|                           |                     |                           |
|                           |                     |                           |
|                           |                     |                           |
|                           |                     |                           |
|                           |                     |                           |

TABLE: Identification of major hazards and conflicts

- 2. Depending whether you want to work on real cases or on fictional cases, follow the instructions:
  - A) Fictional scenario:

Ask the participants to read the scenario (MABEBUNI in ANNEX 11) carefully and proceed to Session 2 afterwards.

- B) Working on real cases:
- 3. Working on real cases: Take the above analysis of the major hazards and conflicts and ask the participants to gather in small working teams and select the most re-levant conflicts/tension/crisis in relation to the project. The participants will select two people out of the respective group to tell the story and analyse it. (cf. Annex 1)

## The cases should be selected according to the following criteria:

- The case is related to our projects/programmes
- It is a group- or community-based dispute (as opposed to interpersonal conflict or dispute)
- It is not an inter-state or international case
- Either direct violence or severe indirect violence is involved
- Behaviour is non-cooperative, destructive and persistent

## $\mathbb{H}$ **Outcome of Step 1:** Matrix of key factors of conflict and fragility (cf. Annex 5)

THE TOOL

STEP 1

33



0

Q

## THE TOOL

It is advisable to use paper-cut or circle-shaped coloured cards in different sizes (according to power and influence of the actors (group). They can be moved and rearranged in the discussions.

## SESSION 2: IDENTIFY ACTORS (ACTORS MAPPING)

In session 2, the participants are asked to do a conflict (actor) mapping (of those individuals or groups who have the capacity to influence for or against peace, to undermine support, to actively promote peace or block it or deliberately perpetrate violence). This helps to identify the actors in the conflict and to understand the relationships between them. (cf. Annex 2)

Explain the tool first and ask participants to gather in groups later.

## Instruction for facilitator

#### THE ACTORS MAP




TABLE: Symbols for Actors MappingAdapted from: InWent, CICO Handbook 2004.

The map in the example depicts the provincial level and helps the programme/project team to be clear about the relationships between the different actors in their context. At the same time, the map was the basis for a discussion within the team about their own position(s) as well as to identify "hidden" conflicts and actors involved in them as well as the nature of the conflict(s): religious, political, social, technical.



Example of Actors Mapping (Hinduskush)

#### Instruction for group work and for presentation:

- 1. Ask: Who are the actors that are relevant to the conflict/crisis/tension?
- 2. Write the names of the actors on round cards: smaller round cards for less powerful actors and bigger round cards for more powerful actors.
- 3. What other parties are involved or connected to these actors? Include marginalised groups and external actors.
- 4. Don't forget to put your own development organisation on the map. Remember: Every organisation, which is involved in a context, becomes part of it! Therefore, it is important to be aware of existing and possible relationships of your organisation.
- 5. Connect the different cards by using various lines reflecting the quality of the relationship between them. Examples for different lines are given above.
- 6. Reflect on the positions of different parties and try to identify alliances, close contacts, broken relationships and known confrontations
- 7. OPTIONAL: You can add the SOTs and CEs (the dividing and connecting issues) between the actors on the map. (cf. Session 3)

It is often useful to repeat the mapping of a conflict situation from a variety of viewpoints in order to understand how the different parties perceive the same situation.

Option: the plenary is divided into several groups and each group prepares a separate map.



Power Analysis could provide a more detailed analysis of the roles of different actors. For more information, please refer to the list of links in the comprehensive 3-Step for WFCS Manual.

## SESSION 3: SOURCES OF TENSIONS (SOT) AND CONNECTING ELEMENTS (CE)

What positive and negative factors (e.g. VALUES, INSTITUTIONS, COM-MON EXPERIENCES, TRADITIONS, STRUCTURES) in the society divide men and women or bring them together? (*cf. Annex 3*)

#### Instruction for facilitator

- Make sure that there is a shared understanding of key factors for conflict and fragility (SOT and CE) at the national level/macro; e.g. the main conflict issues (see also previous introductory session on key factors).
- Make sure the groups know which tensions/conflict/crisis they want to look at.
- Make sure that the groups are looking at a concrete situation around the project and programme. Instead of analysing the overall political situation for example in Afghanistan and the influence of international interest on the conflict; It is important to look at the conflict situation identified above in Sessions 1 & 2.

#### Instruction for facilitator

 A) Brainstorm session (using the key questions below or other appropriate questions)

Plenary or small groups: everybody shares ideas and the ideas are collected on a **flip chart OR on cards** 

#### Instruction to the person steering the brainstorming:

- If buzz-words, short expression or stereotypes are mentioned, always ask: Why is this a SOT, CE (e.g. shortage of water, mistrust, illegal immigrants)
- If the card is not clear, ask the group to rephrase or try to rephrase yourself
- Keep some pace, do not discuss too long (generate quantity)

#### Key Questions to stimulate discussions<sup>28</sup>

The following questions can be used to unlock SOTs and CEs in a variety of ways:

- · What leads to tension in the current situation?
- What are the connecting elements?
- What are the current threats to peace and stability?
- What supports stability and non-violence?
- How are women and men affected differently by tensions?
- What do people do together despite tensions?



It is important that someone more experienced or better trained takes the lead in this process to steer the collection.

#### Instruction for groups

- Select the most important SOTs and CEs
- · Create a headline (or title) for each
- Note in one sentence why it is important
- Optional for more advanced users: HERE IS THE MOMENT ONE CAN THINK ABOUT INDICATORS: For measuring if the SOT (or CE) is getting better or worse

#### Sources of Tensions With headline and sentence to explain Post civil war trauma: There is a significant lack of trust in the population; trust is limited to one's own group. Weak governance: Women and men cannot establish or defend their claims on resources. Unequal distribution of foreign assistance: Some communities and some groups seem to get more than others and some groups feel discriminated against. Affiliation to different political parties: The government (and also local strong men) favour some and discriminate against others. With headline and sentence to explain **Connecting Elements** Some reasonably legitimate local institutions: Some 3/4 of District Development Committees and Community Development Committees are functioning well. These manage and mitigate local level issues and problems. Common religion: In this province, all people are Muslim, which creates trust and a common identity. Tribal/traditional institutions/law: Women probably and men certainly are able to connect and interact across districts through these institutions. They also manage conflict. Local sporting event: Common experiences in cricket create trust and relief from stress. Bazaar day: All men (women are supposed

SOT and CE (Hindukush)

to stay at home) come together and trade

goods with each other

#### THE TOOL

#### STEP 1

## Ê

STRONG FACILITATOR ROLE: use the the 5 main categories: VALUES, INSTITUTIONS, COMMON EXPERIENCES, TRADITIONS, STRUCTURES

## SESSION 4: KEY GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS FOR CONFLICT AND FRAGILITY



Which aspects of local governance are causing the most difficulties in this context? (cf. Annex 4)

This session provides a rating of governance-related issues that come up when working in conflict-affected and fragile contexts. It will produce a number of governance factors that are especially relevant for this particular fragility / conflict setting. The ratings proposed are based on the perception and self-assessment of local stakeholders.

- 1. Which organisations are responsible for security, justice and development? **Instruction**: Note them on a Flipchart.
- What are the key governance problems? Instruction for plenary session: In plenary, the facilitator asks participants to look at the institutions noted above while s/he places tape or a rope on the floor going from one end of the room to the other – on one end s/he places a card with number 1 written on it and on the other a card with number 5.

One by one, the facilitator of the session reads the statementsA-G below and asks participants to rate them on the rope according to the following ranks: (5 correct - 4 quite correct - 3 sometimes correct - 2 very rarely correct– 1 incorrect)

- Are the relevant local institutions providing adequate services? RATE 1-5
- B) Are the relevant local institutions serving all community members equally? RATE 1-5
- C) Do the relevant local institutions provide security for all? RATE 1-5
- D) Do the relevant local institutions resolve local level conflict, while avoiding "winner takes it all situations"? RATE 1-5
- E) Are the relevant local institutions transparent and accountable<sup>29</sup> to all? RATE 1-5
- F) Do women and men organise themselves in local interest groups, clubs or associations, which influence local level decision-making? RATE 1-5
- G) Do relevant institutions take up local grievances? RATE 1-5

Once participants have positioned themselves along the rope, the facilitator asks a few people to explain why they are standing in a given place.

<sup>29</sup> For Public Audit Practice and Downward Accountability please refer to the Manuel for WFCS

#### EXAMPLE:

The facilitator reads out statement A ("Are the relevant local institutions providing adequate services?") and asks participants to stand along the rope where they think the institutions they previously listed on the flipchart stand. The participants who fully agree with the statement will stand close to the end of the rope with the card number 5, those who think the statement is incorrect will stand close to the end of the rope with card number 1. The co-facilitator takes a picture of the group to capture the collective ranking / answer of the group and takes minutes while the facilitator asks participants to explain their position.

The exercise results in discussion that could be captured with explanations like the ones below

- A The Community Development Committee is trusted and provides 4 services within their capacity (little allocation of funds from the centre).
- B The provincial administration is perceived as caring only for the needs 2 of selected communities
- B Some community members are served better than others (due to good 1 relationships)
- C The local police is only accountable to their superiors, controlled by 3 factionalized elite in the capitol. Sometimes unable to intervene in cases of theft.
- C The security situation is difficult, due to many demobilized insurgent 1 fighters that are now unemployed and not integrated into national security forces.
- D Local disputes are rarely brought up, because the minority population 4 never wins.
- E The local government (the administration) does not provide informa- 2 tion to all about spending on public projects, also no legitimate local government present. E The district government does not provide details about allocation of 1
- funds from the centre. 5
- F Women's groups are very important for social work.
- F Religious groups are serving all community members, regardless of 5 their religion.
- G Local grievances are only very rarely taken up and local institutions are 1 largely unable to cope with them.

All listings with a number 3 or lower should be added to the Governance section of CONFLICT AND FRAGILITY MATRIX, in the next session (session 5).

Positive Governance factors (4 and 5) can be integrated in the CEs.

Instruction for group sessions: In small groups, e.g. regional groups, go through questions A-G and rate the relevant institutions with the same scale (1-5). Capture your discussions on a flipchart.

| Institution | Rating |
|-------------|--------|
|             |        |
|             |        |
|             |        |
|             |        |
|             |        |
|             |        |
|             |        |

## THE TOOL

# SESSION 5: THE CONFLICT AND FRAGILITY MATRIX, SUMMARIZE ALL ELEMENTS

#### What are the main aspects of conflict and fragility?

The outcome of step 1, the conflict context analysis, is the following matrix, which summarises the discussions of the different sessions. However, it is important to note that it is a simplifying tool and that the substance of the discussions needs to be documented in the minutes. This will help with the report writing. It is important that the matrix can be shared with women and men who did not participate in the session such as desk officers at head-quarter level, partners and stakeholders.

The standardised format helps to:


- Create a good overview on the key elements of the conflict, which are relevant for the program/project.
- · Prioritise the SOTs and CEs with regards to the project.
- Update conflict context analysis on a regular basis.

#### Instructions

- 1. Describe the type of violence, fragility or conflict in the country/region (cf. Session 1)
- 2. Go through the prioritised SOTs and CEs (cf. Session 3)
- 3. Allocate the identified conflict actors to the respective SOT or CE.
- 4. Fill in the relevant GOV factors (cf. Session 4) in the GOV section of the Conflict and Fragility Matrix

#### CONFLICT and FRAGILITY MATRIX cf. Annex 5

| Types of violence: (see Step 1 session 1, "main crisis/tensions/conflict") |  |  |  |  |
|--|--|--|--|--|
| Key actor(s) relevant to this SOT/0  |  |  |  |  |
| SOT 1:   |  |  |  |  |
| SOT 2:   |  |  |  |  |
| SOT 3:   |  |  |  |  |
| CE 1:  |  |  |  |  |
| CE 2:  |  |  |  |  |
| CE 3:  |  |  |  |  |
| GOV FACTORS:   |  |  |  |  |
| -  |  |  |  |  |
| -  |  |  |  |  |



Ĥ

TABLE: Conflict and Fragility Matrix

## SOT und CEs (not yet containing GOV factors) from Hindukush

|           | KAHMARD Confli  | ct context mat                                       | TIX   |
|-----------|---|--|-------|
|           | SOT + LCC   | ACTORS   | TREND |
|           | SOT4. Competition over having key perif-<br>inst a the community and even in<br>the district  | Q Cabulam Sakai<br>Q Toraquol<br>Other communders    | 4     |
|           | (art): Interast (group leaders support<br>only mor members and members support  | a abulan lakhi<br>a Toregul                          | -*    |
| Traveller | Sot 3: History of part conflict<br>Epople remember the part conflict<br>where they lost their relatives   | Q. Chalen Labor<br>Q. Toragal<br>and affected people | 17    |
|           | LECA: Respect of agreement by beth<br>agraps (fear of government by beth<br>intervention)   | L.G., Shura Ulama,<br>DDA, alders                    |       |
|           | (CC3) Heatory of past conflict<br>(west people do not most to be enjoyed<br>in kibling commerc) and they would like<br>to not team any family teambers any more | people.  | 1     |
| 1         | LCC3: Participation in meetings<br>and common formal gatherings   | people CDC   | 1     |

# LCC = CE

#### EXAMPLE Step 1

| NEPAL / AFGHANISTAN:<br>Types of violence: Warlords fighting for local/regional pow<br>(political conflict), local conflicts with wider political or ideol   |   |
|--|---|
| STEP 1   | Key actor(s) relevant to this SOT/CE        |
| SOT 1: Donor wants us to retreat from Maoist areas   | Armed opposition groups,<br>NGO, Donor, GoN |
| SOT 2: Staff is suspected of being spies by both parties   | Both parties to the<br>conflict             |
| SOT 3: The local population perceives high security<br>walls and barbed wire as violent and intimidating. This can<br>reduce the trust in the development organisation and even<br>lead to tensions with the community   |   |
| SOT 4: If the organisation is engaging security staff<br>from a tribe which is perceived as responsible for the<br>tense situation, it might either mean that they might be<br>more trustworthy than expected or that the development<br>organisation is one-sided | Armed opposition groups<br>& NGO            |
| CE 1: Good relationships between the parties in the con-<br>text of the NGO projects.  | GoN, Maoists & NGO                          |
| <ul><li>GOV PROBLEMS:</li><li>No legitimate local government present (only administration)</li><li>Grievance mechanism not functioning properly</li></ul>  |   |

## THE TOOL

## SESSION 6: SCENARIOS FOR SHORT-, MID- AND LONG-TERM

The scenarios are stories about the way the world might turn out if certain trends continue and/or if certain conditions are met.

(cf. Annex 6)

#### Instruction:

- 1. Define the time frame you want to look at.
- 3. Discuss the indicators below.

You may be confident in some of your assumptions, and you may be sure that certain trends will work through in a particular way. After challenging them appropriately, discuss different trends and how the different trends may influence the situations.

4. Develop Scenarios.

Now, starting with key assumptions, take two extreme outcomes as 2 different possible scenarios (the business as usual version is integrated into both scenarios), and develop a story of the future around the two different versions you've chosen. The picture below shows one possible scenario and a second one with a different outcome may be developed

**Tip:** In identifying trends, be careful to base your assessment on evidence rather than supposition.

#### Indicators:


- 1. Number of violent conflicts
- 2. Interpersonal safety and security
- 3. Participation of minorities including women
- 4. Political conflict and polarisation of political debate
- 5. Civic activism, amount and independence of civil society organisations
- 6. Quality (of service delivery) of local/national institutions
- Legitimacy of the state, or acceptance of the state as perceived by ..... citizens

#### Instruction:


Discuss possible measures to react to the different scenarios.

SCENARIO 1:

. . . . . . . . . . . .



SCENARIO 2:







## THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE CONFLICT CONTEXT AND THE ORGANISATION

It is never a whole assistance programme that is having an impact. It is a piece of assistance programmes, it is one or several of the decisions that result in a negative - or positive - impact on the conflict<sup>30</sup>).

In this step the conflict-context analysis (key elements of conflict and fragility, as in the CONFLICT AND FRAGILITY MATRIX) is compared against the three elements, which constitute the intervention on the ground:

- the programme/projects
- the organisation
- · its relations with partners and stakeholders.

These three elements are thereafter called fields of observation.

This second analytical step – out of the three steps of the approach - will show at which points the organisation and the SOTs and CEs interact directly. It indicates to staff and partners at which points they have to take action in order to avoid negative consequences and foster a positive impact on the context.

Additionally, this step reinforces a common understanding among the staff and the implementing partners on how the organisation handles its activities in a fragile situation. Tensions in the context of a programme/project have an impact on the levels of trust and confidence among the local population, authorities and decision-making institutions. This affects development organisations in various ways, e.g. the working atmosphere: People who have been working together for a long time may be unable to continue a relatively value-free working relationship with each other; interests of the organisation might be shifting etc. A stronger emphasis on inclusive and participatory processes is helpful in reducing internal pressures, which might be higher due to the instability of the context. Therefore this step is one of the key moments for an increased level of sensitivity to conflict, violence and fragility within the organisation. THE TOOL STEP 2

Ê

The outcomes of Step 2:

- 1. The management of the organisation, staff and members of implementing partners have a good sense of how the conflict context and the programme/project interact with each other.
- 2. A list of interactions between the development organisation and the conflict context indicates at which points action is needed in order to avoid negative consequences and foster a positive impact on the conflict.

<sup>30</sup> The Do No Harm Framework for Analyzing the Impact of Assistance on Conflict, CDA,2004.

All aid programmes involve the transfer of resources (social services, training, food, shelter, water, health care, funds), which are the most obvious interaction with the context apart from an organisations's policies and positions. All these aspects have a particularly sensitive effect on the sources of tension and connecting elements. Implicit Ethical Messages - the way in which aid is delivered and communication- play an important role too.

## RESOURCE TRANSFERS, IMPLICIT ETHICAL MESSAGES & COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION GATHERING AND SHARING<sup>31</sup>

According to the experience of CDA's Do No Harm Project assistance in general interacts with the context mainly through Resource Transfers and Implicit Ethical Messages. In our own experience, communication and information gathering/sharing also plays a major role.

**Resource Transfers:** When outside resources (food, funds, health care, training, mobility, etc.) are introduced into a resource-scarce environment where men and women are in conflict with each other, the local people see these resources as representing power and wealth. Thus, they become part of the conflict. People in conflict attempt to control and use assistance resources to support their side of the conflict and to weaken the other side.

**Implicit Ethical Messages:** Implicit Ethical Messages focus on "how" assistance is offered. The ways in which assistance is offered carry a series of implicit messages that, also, have an effect on conflict.

**Communication and information gathering/sharing:** Communication and information gathering/sharing has proved to be one of the main issues especially in the field of development cooperation where relationships on the ground are often long-term, a lot of capacity building is included where relationships are close and undergo many changes during project implementation. At the same time, appropriate communication within the organisation as well as with partners about the fragile situation and its specific challenges is of utmost importance and is often a major challenge for all collaborators.

#### FIELDS OF OBSERVATION


The elements of the organisation and the relations with partners and stakeholders have both a strong influence on whether the activities of a programme succeed and whether they increase their connecting potential and consequently have a positive impact on the conflict. Therefore Resource Transfers and Implicit Ethical Messages are not only relevant at the level of the programmes and projects but also at the levels of the organisation and their relations with partners and stakeholders. This means that the review of the interaction between the development organisation and the conflict context includes the projects, the organisation and partners and stakeholders.

<sup>31</sup> The Do No Harm Framework for Analyzing the Impact of Assistance on Conflict, CDA,2004.

- 1. Programmes and projects: The elements within this category are relevant to the operational side of development interventions in the field, where the most direct point of interaction with the local context occurs. They include:
  - a. Objectives of the entire programme
  - b. Objectives of specific projects
  - c. Project activities
  - d. The selection of (groups of) the concerned/beneficiaries/rights holders
  - e. Resource transfer to the local environment (beneficiaries, stakeholders, communities, etc.)
  - f. Information gathering and sharing
- 2. Organisation: The elements within this category are relevant to the organisational structure. Some of these aspects might overlap with programmes/projects. The following aspects have to be regularly checked on conflict sensitivity:
  - a. The principles and working approaches
  - b. Staff (incl. recruitment policies)
  - c. Security management and geographical intervention areas
  - d. Internal communication
  - e. Coordination
  - f. Fundraising, donors and resource allocation.
- 3. Relations, including partners and stakeholders of the programme: The following aspects have to be looked at:
  - a. Implementing partners
  - b. Communication with stakeholders
  - c. Communication with local authorities
  - d. Donors

The three elements – programme/project, organisation and relationshipsare strongly linked and interdependent and form together the organisation's interaction with the context.

#### **Fields of observation**



## THE TOOL

#### PREPARATIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS

- Invite the inner circle of the programme's stakeholders. These are maybe fewer people than invited for the conflict-context analysis. Ideally 10-20 persons might participate. Ensure that members of the senior management as well as men and women who are involved in financial decisions and security officers are present. If you are focusing on a specific project, the emphasis is on key staff and implementing partners rather than on a wider participation of representatives of the whole organisation.
- Preferably, men and women who participated in the conflict-context analysis are invited too. If this is not possible, make sure that all participants are informed about the results of the discussion of the conflict-context analysis beforehand.
- Ensure a good mixture between international, national and local staff, different management levels and gender balance.
- The meeting will take about half a day and needs to be held in a location, which is convenient for a focused and uninterrupted discussion where participants feel comfortable.
- This exercise takes place in the form of a structured discussion. It may have more of a meeting than workshop character.

#### Instruction for the facilitator

- The facilitator introduces the three areas of discussion programme/project, organisation and relationships (cf. Fields of observation above).
- If different levels of staff and partners are present, the facilitator suggests the groups and allocates the right set of questions (for implementers or for managers).
- The facilitator introduces the questions with examples and suggests suitable breakout groups.
- The breakout groups can be formed according to the respective positions of participants (management- or field level) and they can be split according to three areas of discussion – programme/project, organisation and relationships.
- Each group will go through the list and results are presented in the final feedback round in the plenary session.
- Make sure that the groups report back to the plenary session and that there is enough time for a final feedback round.
- The groups look at the previously established conflict and fragility matrix of the SOTs, CEs and actors. They use the guiding questions below as a guideline for the discussion. As a facilitator, make sure that the groups always discuss the guiding questions with regards to the SOTs and CEs and actors identified in the CONFLICT AND FRAGILITY MATRIX (key elements of conflict).
- The facilitator introduces the guiding questions and the groups discuss the "CHECKLIST STEP 2a and CHECKLIST STEP 2b"
- Depending on your focus and previous discussion within your organisation you may decide to leave out some of the questions.
- Fill the form at the end of the guiding questions during the exercise.

## EXERCISE WITH GUIDING QUESTIONS

CHANGE: Fragile contextes tend to change quickly. Consequently, key issues or drivers of conflicts and tensions are in constant change. However, objectives and activities of projects often remain the same over years. Activities, which were necessary and beneficial in the previous situation, may have lost their relevance and are now doing harm.

The devil is in the details. Therefore, it is important to look at concrete interactions between project and context.

#### HOW TO USE THE GUIDING QUESTIONS:

- The questions for implementation level should be discussed with partners and field staff.
- Questions for management and programme level are meant to serve as a checklist.

If initial WFCS processes have already taken place, it may be sufficient for staff to work along the questions (without a full workshop).

#### COUNTRY STRATEGY OR PROGRAMME LEVEL

For country-level strategies and programme level, please use the corresponding *Annex* in the comprehensive manual.

Additional tools such as the Political Economy Analysis provide guidance on the analysis of political systems, state-society relations as well as the distribution of power between classes and groups for strategic level decisionmaking are in the comprehensive manual.

#### IMPLEMENTATION LEVEL

Working with communities in a fragile or conflict-affected situation involves numerous challenges for project implementers and field staff. Field staff and people concerned with everyday execution of projects generally have a different but equally important perspective on the interaction between project and context. Often they are themselves part of the context and need to find a fine balance between the demands that come with their jobs and obligations they have towards their families and friends. In a conflict context, buying your vegetables at the wrong shop or driving the wrong car can be a serious issue. At the same time, any attitude not carefully reflected, may evoke adverse feelings or suspicion.

The questions in the checklist Step 2a will create a platform for these reflections and serve as a guideline to start the process. The questions intend to unlock the issues and stimulate discussions about them.

The questions in the "Management level" section may also apply for the field level, the facilitator will determine which questions are most suitable.

## 

The more precise the interaction between the project objectives, activities and the previously analysed factors in conflict are described, the more concrete decisions can be taken later to avoid the fuelling of tensions.

Checklist for Implementation level, Step 2a (see Annex 7)

#### 49

THE TOOL

STEP 2

## **P**

Q

Format Step 2b: Management level & focal point fragility and conflict (Annex 8) during the following exercise.

### MANAGEMENT AND PROGRAMME LEVEL

#### Project

#### Guiding questions regarding OBJECTIVES AND ACTIVITIES

A project's objectives and activities are the core of sensitivity to fragility and conflict. Resource Transfers and Implicit Ethical Messages are most directly related to the environment through the activities. A critical comparison of objectives and the activities of the projects with actors, SOT, CE and governance problems noted in the CONFLICT AND FAGILITY MATRIX OF STEP 1 are therefore needed on a regular basis.

#### Instruction for the facilitator

Describe how the goals/objectives of the project relate to the conflict context.

#### Checklist

- Look at your STEP 1 analysis and determine how your objectives relate to the conflict context:
- → How are your objectives affected by the conflict context? Can you reach the objectives if you consider the conflict-context analysis?
- Look at your STEP 1 analysis and consider whether the project activities will likely lead to the envisaged change. Note that the selection of activities to consider depends on the conflict you have identified.
- → Will the activities likely lead to the envisaged change if you consider the conflict actors and the sources of tension?

## Guiding questions regarding "THE CONCERNED"/PRIMARY STAKE-HOLDERS.

Both direct and indirect concerned/beneficiaries are part of the context. In a tense situation, the definition of the concerned/beneficiaries may become very controversial. In a polarised situation communities and stakeholders may easily perceive the selection process as unfair. Groups which are not supported may start to put or increase pressure on the concerned. Selected groups may gain in power or be lifted into new positions in order to profit from the resources given to them by the development organisation. This may lead to further social exclusion or marginalisation of excluded groups. Resource transfers may also attract attention of the parties to the conflict to the concerned and put them in danger.

#### Instruction for the facilitator

 Ask the participants to describe the direct or indirect links between actors of tension/conflict and the concerned.

#### Checklist

3. Are there rights-holders/beneficiaries who are actively taking sides or supporting one party to the conflict (e.g. different perspectives)?

#### Information/Communication

#### Guiding questions regarding INFORMATION GATHERING AND SHAR-ING as well as EXTERNAL COMMUNICATION

In a fragile situation, information might be biased and distorted, sources of information often manipulate information for political reasons and recipients interpret the information through their own conflict lens. Therefore, information gathering and sharing has to be handled carefully in order to assure that one interest group in the conflict does not use project resources for its own goals.

It has been observed in various organisations that the perception of a situation varies considerably between the staff in the field, programme offices and at headquarters. This might lead to misunderstandings and it might hinder flexible and short-term adjustments. Hence, internal communication and the way issues pertaining to tensions and conflict situations are reported within the organisation are crucial. It is strongly recommended that the reporting refers to the Conflict & Fragility Matrix to have the conflict-context analysis integrated into the regular reporting.

Other stakeholders who have an interest in the project, but are outside the project/programme implementation, need to be carefully considered. They may exert substantial influence over the project's objectives and outcomes. Such stakeholders can, for example, be local communities, the business community, influential individuals but also paramilitary or even criminal groups. The programme or project team has to identify these stakeholders and roughly know their positions and interests in the conflict setting or tense situation respectively.

#### Instruction for the facilitator

- What are the sources of information about the tensions in the context of the project/programme? (see checklist below for illustration)
- With whom is your organisation sharing its information about the tensions in the context?
- Is there a clear communication between the field staff and headquarters on issues relating to tense situations, which reinforces the common understanding of the situation and supports effective decision-making?
- What is the role of other stakeholders of the programme with regards to the SOTs and CEs and actors?

## Checklist

- 4. Look at the actors' map from STEP 1 and check if you have balanced information about the context from all stakeholders involved.
- 5. Does the organisation actively encourage all staff to have structured discussions about conflict issues?
- 6. Are there specific moments (in the PCM) where conflict analysis (STEP 1) and other issues about conflict sensitivity are shared within the organisation?
- 7. Do you have a clear policy specifying with whom you share what type of information (e.g. different reports for different stakeholders)?
- 8. Do you have a clear information-sharing policy which includes guidance on suitable language (e.g. sensitive words) and form (e.g. written-oral, stating names-hiding names)?

STEP 2

THE TOOL

#### Ê

- In fragile and conflict contexts, information about different interests, strategies of partners, the stakeholders, the staff, beneficiaries, etc. may be highly sensitive. The development organisation has to make sure that revealing information does not endanger staff and beneficiaries.
- Various different sources of information from different sides are a must in fragile contexts. This includes information from government and local authorities, civil society actors, opposition leaders, warring factions (if accessible) in order to be able to create a situation analysis, which is as balanced as possible.

#### **Own organisation**

#### Guiding questions regarding VALUES AND PRINCIPLES

In a conflict context, the guiding principles of a development organisation, (e.g. participation, equal rights for men and women, transparency) may be delicate to implement because people may be put at risk. Transparency, for example which requires information sharing, needs more caution in tense situations. Sometimes it is necessary to keep information secret in order to protect those concerned.

Guiding principles or values of the organisation might not correspond with those of the key actors in the conflict. The intervention of foreign organisations might not be welcome everywhere.

If an organisation decides to make some concessions in order to strengthen the most marginalised and affected by conflict (staying engaged), these concessions have to be decided for a limited period of time on the basis of reliable information and explicit assumptions.

Review the principles of your organisation and discuss whether their implementation is affected by the tensions.

#### Instruction for the facilitator

Discuss the different working principles your organisation adheres to. The participants review the principles of their organisation and discuss whether their implementation is affected by the tensions.

#### Checklist

 Does the organisation have working principles and values which are difficult to implement due to the fragile situation? (Look at the Sources of Tensions (SOT) and Connecting Elements (CE) as well as actors to answer this question).

Possible principles and values to look at are:

- a. Partnership
- b. Social Equity
- c. Gender Equity
- d. Transparency
- e. Accountability
- f. Local Ownership
- g. Long-term Engagement
- h. Empowerment and Capacity building
- i. Non-discrimination
- j. Advocacy

#### **Guiding questions regarding STAFF**

An escalation or de-escalation of conflict usually happens unexpectedly. The implementing structure of a programme or a specific project sometimes needs to be revisited and has to be adjusted at short notice. Where staff members come from (their ethnic affiliation) and which social class they belong to may become important. A tense situation also affects internal staff relations. Tensions can grow between staff and who is working in which position may become important. If, for instance, ethnic tensions are part of the conflict, attention has to be put on the ethnic affiliations of staff members in a particular region. Due to changing priorities and the dynamics of the conflict situation, staff may have to be withdrawn from one area and new positions created in other areas. There may be also a need for more staff members to engage with men and women who are most affected by the conflict. Also, there might be a need for capacity-building in areas pertaining to key issues of conflict and conflict sensitivity.

#### Instruction for the facilitator

- How are considerations of conflict sensitivity and staff diversity integrated into staff recruitment (Staff composition, contract details, code of conduct)?
- What is the background of the staff of your organisation and what are their positions with regards to key factors of fragility and conflict?

#### Checklist

- 10. Is there a staff recruitment policy including criteria for conflict sensitivity?
- 11. Are all staff well aware and appropriately trained to work in a tense situation?
- 12. Is the (ethnic, religious, social, political, etc.) diversity which exists in the context equally respected in the team compositions and hierarchies?
- 13. Are all staff on the ground perceived as neutral?
- 14. Are there staff members who can no longer be sent to specific geographic areas (due to ethnic background, gender, previous experiences, etc.)?

#### Example:

Staff recruitment and assignments are highly sensitive in conflict situations, particularly when the conflict is based on ethnic divisions. If one ethnic minority is fighting for more self-determination and feels discriminated against and members of this particular minority are mainly support staff, but not in higher management positions, this may create tensions within the organisation. It also has an impact on the image and perception of the organisation towards its partners and the local authorities.

#### **Guiding questions regarding SECURITY**

Security regulations and geographic implementation areas

Security situations may change rapidly. Accessibility to certain geographic areas might be increasingly difficult and security arrangements and procedures for the staff require adjustment.

Conflict sensitivity does not replace a security assessment. A security risk assessment has to be carried out regularly and separately with the staff and partners. The main question of a security assessment is what has to be done to improve the safety and security of the staff and partners in the current context.

WFCS is looking at how these security regulations impact on the tensions in the context. Checking on changing priorities of partners, stakeholders, concerned communities as well as their perceptions are important since security regulations are visible and might be perceived in different ways (cf. Implicit Ethical Messages).

## THE TOOL

#### Instruction for the facilitator

- How are the security regulations of your staff perceived in the context (by partners, stakeholders, concerned communities)?
- What are the consequences of certain regulations?
- How can security be maximized?

#### Checklist

- 15. Do you have a clear and shared policy about closure of programmes/ projects due to security concerns as well as about staff security (Implicit Ethical Messages)?
- 16. Do your security regulations encourage you to invest in trust relationships with local partners and stakeholders to increase safety and security rather than relying on armed protection by security sector actors or other armed security arrangements?

#### Guiding questions regarding PROCUREMENT AND LOGISTICS

Activities on the ground require logistical items such as cars, gasoline, food, office materials, office rent, etc. In order to be conflict-sensitive, it is important to know who the providers of these assets are since this is also a direct resource transfer to the context.

"Aid affects prices, wages and profits and can either reinforce the war economy, (enriching activities and people that are war-related) or the peace economy (reinforcing "normal" civilian production, consumption and exchange)."<sup>32</sup> Logistics needs to be checked on conflict sensitivity on a regular basis because the devil is in the details.

#### Instruction for the facilitator

Explain what is meant here and go through the list below

## Checklist

17. Procurement: where are materials coming from and who benefits from selling/renting them?

Possible items to look at:

- Cars
- Gasoline
- Office rent
- Rent for staff accommodation
- Food
- Service providers of communications (phone, internet, etc.)
- Generators
- Maintenance services for office building
- Office equipment and materials

#### External actors

#### Guiding questions regarding PARTNERS AND DONORS

Many international development organisations work through local partners and with donors. In a tense and polarised situation, working with a particular local partner organisation can send a political signal and this might have undesired consequences. In some situations, partner organisations are limited in their performance due to political constraints.

Therefore it is important to know the partners and how they are perceived to establish a trust relationship over a longer period of time.

Who to partner with is also crucial for the local perception and security of the programme. A good partner organisation often enables a programme to continue under difficult circumstances.

#### Instruction for the facilitator

Discuss partners and donors and their respective roles in relation to the main conflict/fragility actors as well as how stakeholders perceive them.

#### Checklist

is one-sided

- 18. Do you know how your partners, donors and partner organisations are perceived (regarding SOTs/CEs and regarding their relationships with other important actors)?
- 19. Are these partners/donors currently engaged in other projects in this conflict context?

#### EXAMPLE Step 1 & Step 2

#### **NEPAL / AFGHANISTAN:**

Types of violence: Warlords fighting for local/regional power, context for state power (political conflict), local conflicts with wider political or ideological affiliations

| STEP 1  |  | <b>STEP 2</b><br>Key actor(s) relevant<br>to this SOT/CE  |
|---|--|---|
| <b>SOT 1</b> : Donor wants us to retreat from Maoist areas  | Armed opposition<br>groups, NGO,<br>Donor, GoN | If we retire we neglect<br>the rights of the<br>disadvantaged and we<br>abandon our primary<br>stakeholders.  |
| <b>SOT 2</b> : Staff is suspected of being spies by both parties  | Both parties to the conflict                   | Staff is under great pressure because of the suspicions.  |
| <b>SOT 3</b> : The local population<br>perceives high security<br>walls and barbed wire as<br>intimidating. This can<br>reduce the trust in the<br>development organisation<br>and even lead to tensions<br>with the community                                      |  | Highly visible security<br>measure can reduce<br>the trust in the develop-<br>ment organisation and<br>even lead to tensions<br>with the community. |
| <b>SOT 4</b> : If the organisation<br>hires security staff from a<br>tribe which is perceived as<br>responsible for the tense<br>situation, it might either<br>mean that they might be<br>more trustworthy than<br>expected or that the<br>development organisation | Armed opposition<br>groups & NGO               | The organisation may<br>no longer be perceived<br>as impartial.   |

## THE TOOL

STEP 2

## 

TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABLITY The handling of financial information is highly sensitive and crucial. The development organisations are well advised to use suitable mechanisms for downward accountability, to provide a suitable amount of transparency.

| CE 1: Good relationships<br>between the parties in the<br>context of the NGO<br>projects.  | GoN, Maoists & NGO             | Due to good relation-<br>ships, most issues can<br>be discussed with<br>BOTH parties to the<br>conflict. |
|--|--------------------------------|--|
|  | Elite and disadvantaged groups | The disadvantaged<br>groups do not dare to<br>speak: no voice for the<br>disadvantaged.                  |
| <ul> <li>GOV PROBLEMS:</li> <li>No legitimate local gover<br/>(only administration)</li> <li>Grievance mechanism n<br/>properly</li> </ul> |                                | The local government<br>is supposed to become<br>a major project partner.                                |

#### **CLOSING STEP 2**

#### INSTRUCTION

After going through the questions, the answers given by the groups should be presented in the plenary session. The facilitator may rephrase or ask for clarifications during the discussion.

Before closing the workshop, the facilitator explains what happens with the information on the identified points of interaction between the development organisation and the conflict context.

 $\rightarrow~$  After closing, all the findings of the groups are kept and used for step 3!





## STRATEGIC DECISIONS FOR PROGRAMME AND PROJECT MANAGEMENT

#### SUMMARY

Knowing that we are not doing harm is the first requirement of working in fragile and conflict-affected situations. We therefore need to know that we are weakening the identified sources of tensions (SOT) and we need to be able to understand the roles and relationships of different groups to know how to work in a tense environment. However, we also need to know that our involvement generates results. Therefore, we may need to build on components that are actually strengthening Connecting Elements (CE) and foster peace and stability.

#### **REVIEW STEP 1 AND 2**

Step 1 and 2 of this manual described analytical steps in order to establish an assessment of the conflict context and how a development organisation interacts with it.

The third step is based on the list of observed interactions (Step 2), leads through different choices or options for adaptations and ends at a few concrete strategic programme/project and management decisions on the necessary special features of the projects to consider conflict and fragility.

#### **Overview**

STEPS Outcome

- → Step 1 Matrix of key factors of conflict and fragility
- → Step 2 List of interactions between context and project
- → Step 3 Strategic decisions (measures and options) and integration into LogFrame

In Step 3 - based on the list of interactions - concrete measures are taken to design or adapt the project/programme.

## Ê

*The* **outcomes** *of Step 3:* 

- 1. The management of the organisation, staff and members of implementing partners have a good sense of how the conflict context and the programme/project interact with each other.
- 2. A list of interactions between the development organisation and the conflict context indicates at which points action is needed in order to avoid negative consequences and foster a positive impact on the conflict.

## THE TOOL STEP 3

#### CREATIVITY NOTE

Before you go into development of options for strategic choices START with an exercise to open up creative potential<sup>33</sup>.

#### EXERCISE (Example):

Challenge participants to create unlimited and imaginative - even fictional - options!

"You are the programme director and you get \$ 500 000 from Brad Pitt to spend in two villages, but you only have 2 months to finish spending. What do you do?"

Or:

"You are the programme director and you need to get help to starving refugees. But between you and the people in need there are two fenced and heavily-guarded oil plants and the rebel armies. What do you do"?

- · Generate as many options (including wild and creative) as possible-"quantity generates quality!" The more options you generate the more good options you will have!
- · Identify those options that offer the best chances of being implemented
- · Verify that the options will not at the same time make the situation worse.

## DEVELOP THE STRATEGIC CHOICES (MEASURES/OPTIONS) FOR MANAGEMENT LEVEL

ALWAYS the starting point for discussions. Check on the outcomes of Step1 and Step 2 to develop the options and measures!

This step is normally done in a smaller management team, which includes senior staff of the field office, senior staff of the partners and one or two administrative staff such as the logistics and the financial officers.

Cf. Annex 9: Format Step 3a: Measures/options for management level

## DEVELOP THE STRATEGIC CHOICES (MEASURES/OPTIONS) FOR IMPLEMENTATION LEVEL

At the project or implementation level the options and measures that result from Step 1 and Step 2 may be more concrete and hands-on. Detailed discussions with field teams are at core of this Step.

Cf. Annex 10: Format Step 3b: Measures/options for field level

## **RE-CHECK OF CHOICES**

Strategic decisions selected will be integrated into the further planning of the project.

E The results from the previous steps are

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> See ideas on how to do that on: "Lateral Thinking" for more exercises, e.g.: http:// www.kent.ac.uk/careers/sk/lateral.htm

The decision about which option will be put in practice needs to be rechecked.

#### **RE-CHECK**:

Possible options depend and need to be adjusted to:

a. The specific context (step 1 - conflict-context analysis)

- b. The specific project (step 2 interactions)
- c. The ability to handle possible challenges that come with the strategic choices as well as the ability to take decisions and to implement them (step 3 strategic choices )

## INTEGRATION OF CONFLICT AND FRAGILITY IN THE LOGFRAME

|  |   | short-term | mid-term | long-term | Resource | es needed |
|--|---|------------|----------|-----------|----------|-----------|
|  |   |            |          |           | Own      | External  |
|  | Measures<br>identified to<br>be integrated<br>in the logframe |            |          |           |          |           |
| <i>Objective A</i><br>Activity 1<br>Activity 2<br>Activity 3 |   |            |          |           |          |           |
| Objective 2<br>Activity 1<br>Activity 2<br>Activity 3        |   |            |          |           |          |           |
| Objective 3<br>Activity 1<br>Activity 2<br>Activity 3        |   |            |          |           |          |           |
| <i>Objective 4</i><br>Activity 1<br>Activity 2<br>Activity 3 |   |            |          |           |          |           |

Taking decisions on different options and measures is a long process, which is most likely not going to be straightforward. Often, the right measures may only appear after extensive discussions and numerous options will have to be discussed and maybe even tested. After embarking on the process of openly and regularly discussing all the difficult issues related to assistance in fragile and conflict-affected situations, however, these discussions will be very beneficial to the programme and projects as they open up new avenues for dialogue and new approaches.

To get additional views on these processes the discussions can be shared with peers, with respective staff in other countries and advisors on conflict transformation at the head office.

## THE TOOL

#### EXAMPLE Step 1, Step 2 & Step 3

STED 3

••

#### NEPAL / AFGHANISTAN:

Types of violence: Warlords fighting for local/regional power, contest for state power (political conflict), local conflicts with wider political or ideological affiliations.

| STEP 1  |  | STEP 2   | STEP 3   |
|---|--|--|--|
|   | Key actor(s) relevant to this SOT/CE           |  |  |
| SOT 1: Donor wants us to<br>retreat from Maoist areas   | Armed opposition<br>groups, NGO, Donor,<br>GoN | If we retire we neglect the<br>rights of the disadvantaged<br>and we abandon our primary<br>stakeholders.  | • Stay engaged but be very clear and transparent in the definition of the disadvantaged groups and share the analysis with all stakeholders.   |
| SOT 2: Staff is suspected of<br>being spies by both parties   | Armed opposition<br>groups, NGO,               | Staff is under great pressure because of the suspicions.   | <ul> <li>Increased training and support for<br/>staff, counselling and intensive com-<br/>munication with both parties, to build<br/>trust.</li> </ul>   |
| SOT 3: The local population<br>perceives high security walls<br>and barbed wire as intimida-<br>ting. This can reduce the trust<br>in the development organisa-<br>tion and even lead to tensions<br>with the community   |  | Highly visible security measure<br>can reduce the trust in the<br>development organisation and<br>even lead to tensions with the<br>community.   | <ul> <li>Rethink security guidelines and engage in a discussion on security with local stakeholders.</li> <li>Carefully re-assess Step 2 of the manual.</li> </ul>   |
| SOT 4: If the organisation is<br>hiring security staff from a tribe<br>which is perceived as respon-<br>sible for the tense situation,<br>it might either mean that they<br>might be more trustworthy than<br>expected or that the develop-<br>ment organisation is one-sided | Armed opposition<br>groups & NGO               | The organisation may no longer be perceived as impartial.  | <ul> <li>Reorganize the security concept.</li> </ul>   |
| CE 1: Good relationships bet-<br>ween the parties in the context<br>of the NGO projects.  | GoN, Maoists & NGO                             | Due to good relationships, most<br>issues can be dis-cussed with<br>BOTH parties to the conflict.<br>The principle of non-discrimi-<br>nation is very difficult to maintain.<br>Working in a society, which is<br>discriminating Sunni women<br>with regards to their education<br>automatically affects any edu-<br>cation project for women in the<br>region. This can create a conflict<br>between the Sunni and Shia<br>population within the village since<br>one group feels marginalised. | <ul> <li>Make use of the trust and space<br/>gained through good project work.<br/>Use it as safe space and platform for<br/>issue-based discussions (e.g. water).</li> <li>Invite wider circles of actors/stakehol-<br/>ders to these discussions.</li> <li>Identify progressive religious persons,<br/>and try to have a dialogue with them<br/>to increase the space for participation<br/>of women.</li> </ul> |
|   | GoN, Maoists & NGO                             | The disadvantaged groups do<br>not dare to speak: no voice for<br>the disadvantaged  | <ul> <li>Long discussions and consulta-tions<br/>with all stakeholders. Decision: QUO-<br/>TA for the constitution of groups and<br/>for executive functions (Women, Dalit,<br/>Janajati)</li> </ul>   |
| GOV PROBLEMS:<br>• No legitimate local government present (only admi-<br>nistrative bodies)<br>Grievance mechanism not functioning properly   |  | The local government is suppo-<br>sed to become a major partner<br>for the project.  | •  |

STED 2

#### CONCLUSION

After having gone through all the steps, you have analysed the context, looked at the interactions between context and project/programme and finally come up with options or measures to react and take steps to strengthen the connecting elements you identified in the previous steps. At the same time sources of tension are identified and measures to weaken them and prevent their escalation are identified in the last step.

What remains to be done is monitor regularly and report all identified issues.

- · Never forget:
- When adjusting the project/programme to the conflict context, do not forget to consider strengthening Connecting Elements.
- There might be financial consequences resulting from the interaction between conflict context and the development organisation, including revised activities, security arrangements, staffing, training and capacity building, etc. The management may have to decide quickly about the financial implications. Therefore, it is also important that financial officers participate in the internal WFCS process.
- Ensure that the staff in charge of WFCS has sufficient weight at the management level.
- Flexible time allocation: Time should be allocated to allow the staff to make conflict-sensitive adjustments in their programmes.
- Check if donors have a policy on conflict sensitivity. Inform donors about possible changes of interventions due to the fragile context. Also inform them that objectives might not be achieved due to the changing situation. In case of a worsening situation, launch an open dialogue with donors.
- WFCS needs to be part of the reporting.
- The language of reports and information about activities need to be sensitive to conflicts. Selected information may have to be translated into local languages.
- In conflict situations, information-sharing is a sensitive topic.


## THE TOOL



## CONFLICT SENSITIVITY IN THE PROJECT CYCLE MANAGEMENT (PCM)

It is necessary to consequently measure and monitor our impact on poverty as well as on conflict and fragility. Working in difficult contexts means dealing with many challenges such as a lack of access to data, security threats, logistical challenges as well as political sensitivities and unpredictable dynamics.

The previous sections of the manual provide guidance for working in fragile and conflict affected situations (WFCS) through analysis and documentation, to make sure that no harm is done. Many practical issues arise in such a process and "business as usual"- approaches to PCM may not work under these circumstances. This section provides ideas to consider in the Project Cycle Management.



65

PCM

#### **RISK ANALYSIS:**

There are many risks in fragile and conflict affected situations that cannot be mitigated or influenced by a program or project. Hence, it is necessary to ensure a good understanding of the overall context to link risk analysis to possible mitigating strategies (include a paragraph in the strategy to explain the link between the fragile/conflict context and the program or project). Generally procedures and tools for program level analysis are the same as for the project level and are laid out in the manual (*Annex 16*).

Results of Step 1 and 2 can be integrated into a general, program-level risk monitoring (Conflict and Fragility Matrix, *page 23*). Many specialized sources (HRW, ICG, Global Witness) and tools are providing data for assessing of the overall country situation and can contribute to program-level conflict context analysis and if detailed enough also to project level analysis (see also "Data sources and Fragile States" *Annex 17 & 18*). The same sources can be used for strategy processes of the country program design.

#### DESIGNING STAGE

 $\mathcal{O}$ 

 $\mathcal{P}$ 

"Checklist for the Designing stage" ANNEX 14 and Instructions for Country Strategy and Programs ANNEX 16 Sensitivity to fragile and conflict affected situations starts in the design phase. All projects in fragile and conflict affected situations should consider their contribution to reducing fragility and/or conflict. To be able to assess the risks and opportunities in a certain context, the Checklist for the Designing stage (*Annex 14*) and instructions for Country Strategy and Programs need to be completed (*Annex 16*). Potential scenarios and risk assumptions for the project need to be integrated in the concept note.

#### THE PLANNING STAGE

The concept note has been approved and the team and partners now have to work out the project details such as the objective, intervention strategies, the activities, the implementation structures the selection of implementing partners, the monitoring and reporting system, budget and possibly a phasing out plan. Sensitivity to fragility and conflict, based on the concept note, will be included and mainstreamed in all aspects of the project. If the conflict context analysis has not been done thoroughly, it has to be completed at this stage. A budget for potential flexible measures related to conflict sensitivity is recommended. Staff needs to be trained and supported with expertise at this stage. Possible indicators to monitor the context can be integrated into PCM.

Method: Conflict context analysis and a theory of change to inform project strategy and approach will have to be developed. Backstopping and advisory services may also be required. Capacity building ensures that staff members and partners are at the same level of understanding and well prepared to implement sensitivity to conflict and fragility.

#### ESTABLISHING BASELINES<sup>34</sup>

Without a baseline, comparisons and measurement of results or impacts are difficult. A baseline identifies the status of the planned change before the project starts but after it has been designed to be able to compare the results.

- 3 areas to consider:
- Change (outcomes)
- Secondary changes
- Assumptions

The first area, change, is required for all baselines (the latter two, secondary changes and assumptions, are optional depending on the project). The majority of baselines focus on collecting data on the status of the targeted change (outcome or outcome-level indicators) before the project begins. For outcomes without indicators, data is collected for the outcome (change) itself.

#### Example: Setting the baseline for a DRC media project

The Media for Democracy and Accountability Project in DRC is a highly innovative approach to building democracy through media. An independent baseline study was commissioned during the inception phase. It assessed the current state of the media sector, including estimated audience sizes, the perception and needs of media managers and the quality of content.

Among the techniques used was to convene a panel of media professionals and analysts in several locations around the country, and ask them to rate the status of a number of issues (for example, press freedom, fairness of licensing laws, plurality of news sources, respect for ethical rules etc.). They also carried out an analysis of content from a representative sample of media outlets, and commissioned additional studies on issues such as the professionalism of journalists. This has led to an innovative monitoring mechanism involving panels of five media professionals and analysts in five locations (rural and urban) convened periodically to assess progress and trends.

Source: DFID INTERIM GUIDANCE NOTE: Measuring and managing for results in fragile and conflict-affected states and situations. 2010.

Method: Staff, external consultants, or mixed team record the status quo of the intended changes, secondary changes and possibly also the prevailing assumptions. Data collection in the process of starting the activities is recommended.

#### MONITORING

During implementation the conflict context analysis has to be updated in the regular monitoring since the fragile context may change significantly. The frequency of such monitoring depends on the context and organisational practice and has to be set accordingly.

Monitoring and reporting on fragility and conflict is automatically integrated once WFCS is conducted regularly and reported upon. Indicators will have

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> Source: DESIGNING FOR RESULTS: Integrating Monitoring And Evaluation In Conflict Transformation Programs 2006 Search for Common Ground. Cheyanne Church and Mark M. Rogers.

to be adapted to the fragile and conflict affected environment. This enables the program management to react on potential changes in the context as well as to correct the intervention strategy if harmful effects are observed and potentials for strengthening capacities for peace are identified.

Documentation of WFCS - as part of regular monitoring and reporting:

Minimal standard: Revisit the check-list (ANNEX 14) for working in fragile and conflict affected situations

WFCS applied: Take the Results of WFCS procedures:

- $\rightarrow$  Insert/document the relevant tables resulting from Step 1-3
- Step 1: Conflict & Fragility Matrix: for context description/monitoring
- Step 2: Comments to the interactions from Checklist 2a und 2b
- Step 3: Strategic Decisions, Format 3a and 3b

 $\rightarrow\,$  Comment on the consequences of the analysis, according to the questions below:

#### Questions:

 $\rightarrow$  Do you plan/adapt your intervention on the basis of the WCFS-analysis (3-Steps)?

Points to report on:

- → What should you keep doing?
- → What should you stop doing?
- → What should you start doing?
- → What should you change?
- → What strategic and financial consequences does that imply?

Method: Ensure a mixed team of experts on conflict/fragility and other more technical issues. A peace and conflict and fragility advisor or external advisory services may assist in elaborating a system. Senior program management staff will check regularly on the interactions with the context and report on it. This can be done in small group discussions. A joint WFCS workshop (step 1-3) has to be conducted regularly with staff, partners and stakeholders.

#### EVALUATION and IMPACT ASSESSMENT

| Impact  |                                   |                        |                         |                               |
|---------|-----------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Outcome |                                   |                        |                         |                               |
| Output  |                                   |                        |                         |                               |
|         | Periodic<br>project<br>monitoring | Project<br>evaluations | Occasional case-studies | Selected<br>impact<br>studies |

Performance indicators

68

The evaluation and impact assessment of WFCS will look at the documented experience with WCFS as well as the changes in conflict context analysis. It is therefore crucial that questions relevant for WFCS are included in ToR for Evaluations/Impact Assessments. An impact assessment putting "fragility" in the centre of attention may be envisaged.

If projects have been planned without an explicit conflict context analysis and conflict sensitive monitoring and reporting systems, the evaluation team needs to determine the assumed negative and positive impact on the conflict context retrospectively. If no baselines are available, recall interviews will be conducted to establish a perspective on the past.

For information on the evaluation of peacebuilding projects see the RE-FLECTING ON PEACE PRACTICE<sup>35</sup> and/or Handbook DESIGNING FOR RESULTS<sup>36</sup>:

Method: See "Monitoring". Ensure a mixed team of experts on conflict/fragility and technical issues.

#### PHASING OUT

The phasing out may create tensions and misunderstandings within the program as well as with partners and stakeholders. Communication- and expectation-management are crucial to avoid conflicts. The concerned, project partners and stakeholders need to understand why the project will stop and they have an active role in measures to prevent misunderstandings which could do harm on the ground.

Methods: In this phase, the conflict context analysis has to be updated; an information workshop (stakeholders' meeting) with partners and stakeholders in order to discuss possible follow up activities should be organized. Decisions on how to go about the phasing out are to be taken on the basis of reports and the evaluation.

<sup>35</sup> RPP, http://www.cdainc.com/cdawww/project\_profile.

69

PCM

php?pid=RPP&pname=Reflecting%20Peace%20Practice

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> DESIGNING FOR RESULTS: Integrating Monitoring And Evaluation In Conflict Transformation Programs 2006 Search for Common Ground. Cheyanne Church and Mark M. Rogers.



## ANNEX 1

## STEP 1 SESSION 1: DEFINE THE CHALLENGE

#### What tensions or violence are we talking about?

## Instruction for group work:

1. As a group: Select the most relevant from the identified major hazards or conflict/tension/crisis you are faced with in your project

- $\rightarrow$  The cases should be selected according to the following criteria:
  - · The case is related to our projects/programs
  - It is a group- or community-based dispute (as opposed to interpersonal conflict or dispute)
  - · It is not an inter-state or international case
  - Either direct violence (against persons, assets or institutions) or severe indirect violence is involved
  - · Behaviour is non-cooperative, destructive and persistent
  - In the case of direct violence: Involves violations or capture of (property) rights over assets, persons, or institutions

## Instruction for presentation (if needed):


- The cases or stories will be presented orally.
- The telling of each story or stories to the plenary should last between 3 and 6 minutes.

## STEP 1 SESSION 2: IDENTIFY ACTORS (ACTOR MAPPING)

Which actors are most relevant for the tensions and what is their relationship?

## Instruction for group work and for presentation:

- a. Ask: Who are the actors that are relevant to the conflict/crisis/tension?
- b. Write the names of the actors on round cards: smaller round cards for less powerful actors and bigger round cards for more powerful actors.
- c. What other parties are involved or connected to these actors? Include marginalised groups and external actors.
- d. Don't forget to put your own development organisation on the map. Remember: Every organisation, which is working in a context, becomes part of it! Therefore, it is important to be aware of your organisation's existing and possible relationships.
- e. Connect the different cards by using various lines reflecting the quality of the relationship between them. Examples for different lines are given above.
- f. Reflect on the positions of different parties and try to identify alliances, close contacts, broken relationships and known confrontations
- 2. OPTIONAL: Can you place the SOTs and LCCs (the dividing and connecting issues) between the actors on the map?



It is often useful to repeat the mapping of a conflict situation from a variety of viewpoints in order to understand how the different parties perceive the same situation.

## STEP 1 SESSION 3: IDENTIFY SOURCES OF TENSIONS (SOT) AND CONNECTING ELEMENTS (CE)

# What positive and negative factors (e.g. VALUES, INSTITUTIONS, COMMON EXPERIENCES, TRADITIONS, STRUCTURES) in the society divide men and women or bring them together?

## 1. Brainstorm to identify SOTs and CEs:

- Use the key questions below or other appropriate questions to:
- → Collect SOTs and CEs on a flipchart (one person recording)

#### BOX: Key Questions to stimulate discussions<sup>37</sup>

The following questions can be used to unlock SOTs and CEs in a variety of ways

- · What leads to tension in the current situation?
- What are the connecting elements?
- What are the current threats to peace and stability? What supports stability and non-violence?
- · How are women and men affected differently by tensions?
- What do people do together despite tensions?

#### 2. Prioritize from brainstorming session

- → Select the most important SOTs and CEs
- → Create a headline (or title) for each
- → Note in one sentence why it is important

## ANNEX 4

## STEP 1 SESSION 4: KEY GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS FOR CONFLICT AND FRAGILITY

Which aspects of local governance are causing the most difficulties in this context?

1. Which organisations are responsible for security, justice and development?

Instruction: Note the most relevant ones on a Flipchart.

2. Question: What are the key governance problems? Instruction:

In small groups (e.g. regional groups) go through questions A-G below and rate the relevant institutions (as noted above) with the same scale (1-5). Note your discussions on a flipchart.

| Institution | Ratin | g |
|-------------|-------|---|
|             |       |   |
|             |       |   |
|             |       |   |
|             |       |   |
|             |       |   |

(5 correct - 4 quite correct - 3 sometimes correct - 2 very rarely correct/- 1 Incorrect/)

- Are the relevant local institutions providing adequate services? RATE 1-5
- B) Are the relevant local institutions serving all community members equally? RATE 1-5
- C) Do the relevant local institutions provide security for all?. RATE 1-5
- D) The relevant local institutions resolve local level conflict, while avoiding "winner takes it all situations"? RATE 1-5
- E) Are the relevant local institutions transparent and accountable<sup>38</sup> to all? RATE 1-5
- F) Are women and men organising themselves in local interest groups, clubs or associations, which influence local level decision-making? RATE 1-5
- G) Do relevant institutions take up local grievances? RATE 1-5

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> See the comprehensive Manual on Public Audit Practice and Downward Accountability

## ANNEX 5

# STEP 1 SESSION 5: CONFLICT AND FRAGILITY MATRIX, SUMMARIZE ALL ELEMENTS

## Instructions

1. Describe the type of violence, fragility or conflict in the country/region (cf. Session 1)

2.

• Go through the prioritised SOTs and CEs (cf. Session 3)

- Allocate the identified conflict actors to the respective SOT or CE.
- 3. Fill in the relevant GOV factors (cf. Session 4) in the GOV section of the Conflict and Fragility Matrix

## **CONFLICT and FRAGILITY MATRIX**

| Types of violence: (see Step 1 session 1, "main crisis/tensions/conflict") |                                      |  |
|--|--------------------------------------|--|
|  | Key actor(s) relevant to this SOT/CE |  |
| SOT 1:   |                                      |  |
| SOT 2:   |                                      |  |
| SOT 3:   |                                      |  |
| CE 1:  |                                      |  |
| CE 2:  |                                      |  |
| CE 3:  |                                      |  |
| GOV FACTORS:   |                                      |  |
| -  |                                      |  |
| -  |                                      |  |

## Ê

Note that the number of elements is not restricted to 3. However it is advisable to limit the list to the most important elements. Further points can be recorded in the minutes.


## ANNEX 6

## STEP 1 SESSION 6: DISCUSS SHORT-, MID- AND LONG-TERM SCENARIOS

- 1. Define the time frame you want to look at.
- Look at your conflict and fragility matrix and discuss the key assumptions and key upcoming events (e.g. the peacekeepers stay ℜ, the president will be re-elected ℜ).
- 3. Discuss the indicators below. You may be confident in some of your assumptions about how the indicators will develop (trends), and you may be sure that certain trends will work through in a particular way. After challenging them appropriately, discuss different trends (how the indicators will develop) and how the different trends may influence the situation.
- 4. Develop Scenarios. Now, starting with key assumptions, take two extreme outcomes as 2 different possible scenarios (the business-as-usual version is integrated into both scenarios), and develop a story of the future around the two different versions you have chosen. The picture below shows one possible scenario and a second one with a different outcome may be developed.
- *Tip: In identifying trends, be careful to base your assessment on evidence . rather than supposition.*

## Indicators:

- 1. Number of violent conflicts
- 2. Interpersonal safety and security
- 3. Participation of minorities (including women's participation)
- 4. Political conflict and polarisation of political debate
- 5. Civic activism, amount and independence of civi-society organisations
- 6. Quality (of service delivery) of local/national institutions
- 7. Legitimacy of the state, or acceptance of the state by citizens



## STEP 2 CHECKLIST 2A: IMPLEMENTATION LEVEL

#### **Resource transfers**

- Theft/Diversion: Fuelling the conflict with stolen or diverted goods. Has it ever happened that materials or money from the projects have been misused, not accounted for properly or stolen (who stole) or misused it and is the theft related to conflict parties)?
- **Market Effects**: Changing local markets with an influx of outside goods. Has the assistance programme had an effect on rising/falling prices in the area (who benefits from the cost increases and who suffers)?
- Distribution Effects: Distributing goods along the lines of the conflict. Does your
  project benefit all groups equally within the defined working environment (look at
  diversity in terms of ethnicity, politics, social status, gender, religion, caste, decent:
  whatever is relevant to frictions in the context)? If not, how do you deal with this?
- Substitution Effects: Replacing existing functioning systems or structures. Are there groups that profit more and if so, do those that profit more consequently have more resources to invest in the conflict?
- Legitimization Effects: Giving legitimacy to a group or leader by working with them. Do the project activities legitimize actors (make them more respected) that contribute to tensions, would these people/groups be less legitimate without the project?
- EXAMPLE OF ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS designed by a HSI country program:
- For the sake of quality and price of some agricultural inputs and material supplies the project purchases some items outside the district. Did the team ever discuss the possibility of being offered the same conditions with the local shopkeeper? If not, why?
- If an infrastructure (protective wall of a floodway, water supply, etc.) benefits a local commander (securing his property, easy access to water, etc) what do you do?

#### Information & Communication

- Did it ever happen that different parties of a local conflict had different opinions on your project? How do you deal with that?
- Do you take/have enough time to explain the project to all relevant stakeholders to avoid misunderstandings or misconceptions? Are there any groups or individuals that seem to misinterpret the projects or your work?
- Are you sometimes not sure how to explain difficulties to your colleagues or managers?
- Do you have equally good relationships and communication channels with all stakeholders or parties to a conflict?
- Do you know where in the PCM conflict- and fragility-related issues are assessed and recorded?

#### Implicit ethical messages:

- Did it ever happen that women or men that benefit from the project therefore get into trouble (e.g. because of local values, local conflicts)?
- Have you ever hired armed personnel? Have people ever used arms to force or threaten you to do or abstain from doing project work?
- Do you sometimes feel that development workers/staff use privileges for their own benefit?
- · Do you feel sufficiently protected?
- Do you sometimes have a feeling of resignation in the sense of not being able to reach your objectives?
- Is it sometimes difficult to convince partners as well as women and men (beneficiaries) to work according to the principles of your organisation? If so, how do you deal with such situations?

#### Comments

STEP 2 CHECKLIST 2B: MANAGEMENT LEVEL & FOCAL-POINT FRAGILITY AND CONFLICT

|                             |   |   | Comments |
|-----------------------------|---|---|----------|
| THE PROJECT                 | OBJECTIVES AND<br>ACTIVITIES                  | <ol> <li>Look at your STEP 1         <ul> <li>analysis and determine how your objectives relate to the conflict context:</li> <li>Objective 1</li> <li>Objective 2</li> <li>Objective 3</li> <li>Objective 4</li> </ul> </li> <li>Look at your STEP 1 analysis and consider whether the project activities<sup>39</sup> likely lead to the envisaged change.</li> </ol> |          |
|                             | "THE CONCERNED"/<br>PRIMARY STAKE-<br>HOLDERS | <ol> <li>Are there rights-holders/be-<br/>neficiaries who are actively<br/>taking sides or supporting<br/>one party to the conflict (e.g.<br/>different perspectives)?</li> </ol>   |          |
| INFORMATION / COMMUNICATION | INFORMATION<br>SHARING                        | 4. Look at the actors' map from<br>STEP 1 and check if you<br>have balanced information<br>about the context from all<br>stakeholders involved?   |          |
|                             | NICATION                                      | 5. Does the organisation active-<br>ly encourage all staff to have<br>structured discussions about<br>conflict issues?  |          |
|                             |   | 6. Are there specific moments<br>(in the PCM) where conflict<br>analyses (STEP 1) and other<br>issues about conflict sensitiv-<br>ity are shared within the<br>organisation?  |          |
|                             | MUNICATION                                    | <ol> <li>Do you have a clear policy<br/>about whom you share what<br/>type of information with (e.g.<br/>different reports for different<br/>stakeholders)?</li> </ol>  |          |
|                             |   | 8. Do you have a clear informa-<br>tion-sharing policy including<br>guidance on suitable lan-<br>guage (e.g. sensitive words)<br>and form (e.g. written-oral,<br>stating names / hiding<br>names)?  |          |

<sup>39</sup> The selection of activities to consider depends on the conflict you have identified

|                  |                        |  | Comments |
|------------------|------------------------|--|----------|
| OWN ORGANISATION | VALUES &<br>PRINCIPLES | <ol> <li>Are there working principles<br/>and values which are difficult<br/>to implement due to the fra-<br/>gile situation? (Look at the<br/>Sources of Tensions (SOT)<br/>and Connecting Elements<br/>(CE) as well as actors to an-<br/>swer this question): Possible<br/>principles and values to look<br/>at are:         <ul> <li>a. Partnership</li> <li>b. Social Equity</li> <li>c. Gender Eequity</li> <li>d. Transparency5</li> <li>e. Accountability</li> <li>f. Local Ownership</li> <li>g. Long-term Engagement</li> <li>h. Empowerment and Capac-<br/>ity building</li> <li>i. Non-discrimination</li> <li>j. Advocacy</li> </ul> </li> </ol> |          |
|                  | STAFF                  | <ul><li>10.Is there a staff recruitment<br/>policy including criteria for<br/>conflict sensitivity?</li><li>11.Are all staff well aware and<br/>appropriately trained to work<br/>in a tense situation?</li></ul>  |          |
|                  |                        | 12.Is the (ethnic, religious,<br>social, political, etc.) diversity<br>which exists in the context<br>equally respected in the team<br>compositions and hierar-<br>chies?  |          |
|                  |                        | 13.Are all staff on the ground perceived as neutral?   |          |
|                  |                        | 14.Are there staff members<br>who can no longer be sent<br>to specific geographic areas<br>(due to ethnic background,<br>gender, previous experi-<br>ences, etc.)?   |          |

|                 |                        |  | Comments |
|-----------------|------------------------|--|----------|
|                 | STAFF                  | <ul> <li>15.Do you have a clear and<br/>shared policy about closure<br/>of programs/projects due to<br/>security reasons as well as<br/>about staff security (Implicit<br/>Ethical Message)?</li> <li>16.Do your security regulations<br/>encourage you to invest in<br/>trust relationships with local<br/>partners and stakeholders to<br/>increase safety and security?</li> </ul>  |          |
| EXTERNAL ACTORS | LOGISTICS              | <ul> <li>17. Procurement: where do materials come from and who benefits from selling/renting them?</li> <li>Cars (rented from a local warlord?)</li> <li>Gasoline</li> <li>Office rental payments</li> <li>Payments for staff accomodation</li> <li>Food</li> <li>Service providers of communications (phone, internet, etc.)</li> <li>Generators</li> <li>Maintenance services for office building</li> <li>Office equipment and materials</li> </ul> |          |
|                 | PARTNERS AND<br>DONORS | <ul> <li>18.Do you know how your partner organisations and donors are perceived (regarding SOTs/CEs and regarding their relationships with other important actors)?</li> <li>19.Are these partners/donors currently engaged in other projects in this conflict context?</li> </ul>   |          |

# STEP 3 FORMAT 3A: MEASURES/OPTIONS FOR MANAGEMENT LEVEL

|                           |   |  | Commonto from                               | Mogguros/On  |
|---------------------------|---|--|---|--------------|
|                           |   |  | Comments from previous Step 2 <sup>40</sup> | Measures/Op- |
| THE PROJECT               | OBJECTIVES AND<br>ACTIVITIES  | <ol> <li>Look at your STEP 1 analysis and determine how<br/>your objectives relate to the conflict context:<br/>Objective 1<br/>Objective 2<br/>Objective 3<br/>Objective 4</li> <li>Look at your STEP 1 analysis and consider whether<br/>the project activities<sup>41</sup> likely lead to the envisaged<br/>change.</li> </ol>   |   |              |
| CATION                    | "THE CONCERNED"/<br>PRIMARY STAKE-<br>HOLDERS<br>INFORMATION<br>SHARING | <ol> <li>Are there rights-holders/beneficiaries who are<br/>actively taking sides or supporting one party to the<br/>conflict (e.g. different perspectives)?</li> <li>Look at the actors' map from STEP 1and check if<br/>you have balanced information about the context<br/>from all stakeholders involved?</li> </ol>   |   |              |
| INFORMATION/COMMUNICATION | INTERNAL<br>COMMUNICATION   | <ul> <li>5. Does the organisation actively encourage all staff to have structured discussions about conflict issues?</li> <li>6. Are there specific moments (in the PCM) where conflict analyses (STEP 1) and other issues about conflict sensitivity are shared within the organisation?</li> <li>7. Do you have a clear policy about whom you share what type of information with (e.g. different reports for different stakeholders)?</li> </ul>  |   |              |
|                           | EXTERNAL<br>COMMUNICATION   | 8. Do you have a clear information-sharing policy<br>including guidance on suitable language (e.g.<br>sensitive words) and form (e.g. written-oral, stating<br>names-hiding names)?  |   |              |
| OWN ORGANISATIO           | VALUES &<br>PRINCIPLES  | <ol> <li>Are there working principles and values which are<br/>difficult to implement due to the fragile situation?<br/>(Look at the Sources of Tensions (SOT) and Con-<br/>necting Elements (CE) as well as actors to answer<br/>this question):<br/>Possible principles and values to look at are:         <ul> <li>a. Partnership</li> <li>b. Social Equity</li> <li>c. Gender Equity</li> <li>d. Transparency</li> <li>e. Accountability</li> <li>f. Local Ownership</li> <li>g. Long-term Engagement</li> <li>h. Empowerment and Capacity building</li> <li>i. Non-discrimination</li> <li>j. Advocacy</li> </ul> </li> </ol> |   |              |

<sup>41</sup> The selection of activities to consider depends on the conflict you have identified

 $<sup>^{\</sup>scriptscriptstyle 40}\,\text{No}$  need to write the comments twice, just take the results of Step 2.

|                 |                        |   | Comments from previous Step 2 <sup>12</sup> | • |
|-----------------|------------------------|---|---|---|
| 0               | STAFF                  | <ul> <li>10. Is there a staff recruitment policy including criteria for conflict sensitivity?</li> <li>11. Are all staff well aware and appropriately trained to work in a tense situation?</li> <li>12. Is the (ethnic, religious, social, political, etc.) diversity existing in the context equally respected in the team compositions and hierarchies?</li> <li>13. Are all staff on the ground perceived as neutral?</li> <li>14. Are there staff who can no longer be sent to specific geographic areas (due to ethnic background, appeder provious experiences etc.)?</li> </ul> |   |   |
| OWN ORGANISATIO | SECURITY               | <ul> <li>gender, previous experiences, etc.)?</li> <li>15. Do you have a clear and shared policy about clo-<br/>sure of programs/projects due to security reasons<br/>as well as about staff security (Implicit Ethical Mes-<br/>sage)?</li> <li>16. Do your security regulations encourage you to<br/>invest in trust relationships with local partners and<br/>stakeholders to increase safety and security?</li> </ul>   |   |   |
|                 | LOGISTICS              | <ul> <li>17. Procurement: where are materials coming from and who benefits from selling/renting them?</li> <li>Cars (rented from a local warlord?)</li> <li>Gasoline</li> <li>Office rental payments</li> <li>Payments for staff accomodation</li> <li>Food</li> <li>Service providers of communication (phone, internet etc.)</li> <li>Generators</li> <li>Maintenance services for office building</li> <li>Office equipment and materials</li> </ul>   |   |   |
| EXTERNAL ACTORS | PARTNERS AND<br>DONORS | <ul><li>18.Do you know how your partner organisations and donors are perceived (regarding SOTs/CEs and regarding their relationships with other important actors)?</li><li>19. Are these partners/donors currently engaged in other projects in this conflict context?</li></ul>  |   |   |

## ANNEX 10

## STEP 3 FORMAT 3B: MEASURES/OPTIONS FOR FIELD LEVEL

|   | Commonto (from                           | Magauraa/Optiona |
|---|--|------------------|
|   | Comments (from<br>Step 2 <sup>12</sup> ) | Measures/Options |
| Resource transfers                            |  |                  |
| Theft/Diversion: Fuelling the conflict        |  |                  |
| with stolen or diverted goods. Has it         |  |                  |
| ever happened that materials or money         |  |                  |
| from the projects have been misused,          |  |                  |
| not accounted for properly or stolen (who     |  |                  |
| stole) or misused it and was the theft        |  |                  |
| related to conflict parties?                  |  |                  |
| Market Effects: Changing local markets        |  |                  |
| with an influx of outside goods. Has the      |  |                  |
| assistance programme had an effect            |  |                  |
| on rising/falling prices in the area (who     |  |                  |
| benefits from the cost increases and who      |  |                  |
| suffers)?                                     |  |                  |
| • Distribution Effects: Distributing goods    |  |                  |
| along the lines of the conflict. Does your    |  |                  |
| project benefit all groups equally within     |  |                  |
| the defined working environment (look         |  |                  |
| at diversity in terms of ethnicity, politics, |  |                  |
| social status, gender, religion, caste,       |  |                  |
| decent: whatever is relevant to frictions in  |  |                  |
| the context)? If not, how do you deal with    |  |                  |
| this?   |  |                  |
| Substitution Effects: Replacing existing      |  |                  |
| functioning systems or structures. Are        |  |                  |
| there groups that profit more and if so do    |  |                  |
| those that profit more consequently have      |  |                  |
| more resources to invest in the conflict?     |  |                  |
| • Legitimization Effects: Giving legitima-    |  |                  |
| cy to a group or leader by working with       |  |                  |
| them. Do the project activities legitimize    |  |                  |
| actors (make them more respected)             |  |                  |
| that contribute to tensions, would these      |  |                  |
| people/groups be less legitimate without      |  |                  |
| the project?                                  |  |                  |
| • EXAMPLE OF ADDITIONAL QUES-                 |  |                  |
| TIONS tailor made by a country pro-           |  |                  |
| gram:   |  |                  |
| o For the sake of quality and price of        |  |                  |
| some agricultural inputs and material         |  |                  |
| supplies the project purchases some           |  |                  |
| items outside the district. Did the team      |  |                  |
| ever discuss the possibility of being of-     |  |                  |
| fered the same conditions with the local      |  |                  |
| shopkeepers? If not, why?                     |  |                  |
| o If an infrastructure (protective wall of a  |  |                  |
| floodway, water supply, etc.) benefits a      |  |                  |
| local commander (securing his property,       |  |                  |
| easy access to water, etc) what do you        |  |                  |
| do?   |  |                  |

|  | Comments (from<br>Step 2 <sup>14</sup> ) | Measures/Options |
|--|--|------------------|
| Information & Communication  | . ,                                      |                  |
| <ul> <li>Did it ever happen that different parties of<br/>a local conflict had different opinions on a<br/>project? How do you deal with that?</li> <li>Do you take/have enough time to explain<br/>the project to all relevant stakeholders to<br/>avoid misunderstandings or misconcep-<br/>tions? Are there any groups or individuals<br/>that seem to misinterpret the projects or<br/>our work?</li> <li>Are you sometimes not sure how to<br/>explain difficulties to your colleagues or<br/>managers?</li> <li>Do you have equally good relationships<br/>and communication channels with all<br/>stakeholders or parties to a conflict?</li> <li>Do you know where in the PCM conflict-<br/>and fragility-related issues are assessed<br/>and recorded?</li> </ul>     |  |                  |
|  |  |                  |
| <ul> <li>Implicit ethical messages:</li> <li>Did it ever happen that women or men that benefit from the project therefore get into trouble (e.g. because of local values, local conflicts)?</li> <li>Have you ever hired armed personnel? Have people ever used arms to force or threaten you to do or abstain from doing project work?</li> <li>Do you sometimes feel that development workers/staff use privileges for their own benefit?</li> <li>Do you sometimes have a feeling of resignation in the sense of not being able to reach your objectives?</li> <li>Is it sometimes difficult to convince partners as well as women and men (beneficiaries) to work according to the principles of you organisation. If so, how do you deal with such situations?</li> </ul> |  |                  |

## 85

## ANNEX 11

## CASE-STUDY MABEBUNI<sup>43</sup>



Map of the republic of Mabebuni

## Situation in the Republic of Mabebuni Introduction:

The Republic of Mabebuni is situated in a semi-arid region. The fertile zones are located in the center of the country and along the river running through the South. Traditionally, the people of Mabebuni are farmers and pastoralists. The country's mineral resources have been only little exploited so far. Conflicts between different ethnic groups and a corrupt political elite have hampered the socio-economic development of the country.

Over the past few months, the political situation has strongly deteriorated. ACIN, an armed group calling for the independence of the territory in the North, unilaterally declared its independence and has forced the regular army out of the Northern region. In the South, a junta that is disappointed by the inaction of the political elite and the inability of the regular army to control the North, ousted the president from power in a military coup. A transitional government of 'National Union' currently is in place that aims at re-establishing the constitutional order and establishing new legitimate institutions.

## Socio-Economic Development

The Republic of Mabebuni is one of the poorest countries in the world. The economy is based on exporting agricultural products, particularly cotton, and the revenue of the gold extractive industry. Recently, promising mineral resources in the North were discovered, but they have not been extracted so far. In the desert plains, there are no economic opportunities except for growing cattle. However, frequent droughts and progressing desertification have jeopardized this traditional life style over the past decades. The literacy rate is below 35% in the peripheral regions, and especially in the North. Basic education is low and youth unemployment is very high. Lacking economic infrastructures, Mabebuni is highly dependent on foreign aid.

The different phases of conflict and the corruption that has become ever more visible have lead to a crisis of the state institutions. Criminal networks profit from the porous borders and the lack of a functioning judicial system. The Republic of Mabebuni has become a center for illegal arms trade, drug trade and human trafficking. Due to the war in Kadalie, Mabebuni's neighbor to the North, many Mabebuni citizens that had previously worked in Kadalie, returned to their homeland. Once the former President of Kadalie, President Fighadi, had been defeated, many Mabebunians that had fought for the former President returned to Mabebuni. Some of them joined the ACIN, the armed independent movement in the North. Since the defeat of Fighadi, Kadalien investments in Mabebuni have strongly decreased.

#### Conflict

Since the independence of the Republic of Mabebuni, ethnic groups in the North have regularly rebelled against the government in the capital Ouacobani, accusing the political elite of not sufficiently taking the needs of peripheral regions into account. Certain ethnic groups in the North, particularly the Regatou, claim the right to self-determination, the respect for their cultural identity, true possibilities for political participation, more investments spurring socio-economic growth in the North and a fair distribution of resources. Over the past 50 years, there had been several armed uprisings against the central government. The situation of the local population deteriorated each time, and despite the many peace agreements, the reasons for the revolts have not been addressed. In consequence of this situation, many Mabebuni have migrated to the neighboring countries, the socio-economic situation of the households deteriorated, political representation is still lacking and some political and armed movements have radicalized. Over the past years, new groups that are considered as 'terrorists' and are supported and financed by radical Islamist movements in the Middle East, have emerged in the region. These groups maintain close ties to the criminal networks active in the region. The lack of socio-economic perspectives makes young people vulnerable to be recruited by armed or criminal groups and trafficking of all kind. In the past six months, some of the armed movements in the North, including the ACIN, whose manpower has increased due to the returning Mabebuni combatants from Kadalie, have proclaimed the independence of the North. The regular army has so far not managed to regain control of the territory due to a lack of knowledge of the region and a lack of resources. On top of the fighting, a food crisis prevails due to a bad harvesting season, the government has so far not been able to distribute food aid. The situation is aggravated by the fact that many international organizations have suspended their activities in the region for security reasons. The food crisis lead to an intensification of conflicts between farmers and pastoralists not only in the North but also in the South: The pastoralists migrate further South than before to find food and water for their cattle and to flee the conflict. In the South, however, they are not well received but perceived as a threat by the Southern farmers. Besides the conflict between the government and the rebel groups regarding the independence of the North, also inter-ethnic conflicts between farmers and pastoralists prevail.

#### **Political Situation**

A multitude of ethnic groups are living together in Mabebuni. Some are organized along a branched structure of clans and families. The affiliation to a certain ethnic group is a very important social characteristic of the people. Besides the nomadic tribes living in the desert regions, as the Regatous, there are others smaller tribes. They are all polarized by the political situation, particularly by the issue of independence of the North. Those that support the independence of the North support the Armed Coalition for an Independent North (ACIN). Others gather in the Islamist Movement of Mabebuni (IMM), coming from different ethnic origins, their representatives call for the establishment of the Sharia, for more autonomy and for economic development in the North; but they want to stay part of the Republic of Mabebuni.

The terrorist Islamic groups (jointly forming the network SIQMA) do not support any of these political claims. They are in favor of the introduction of the Sharia and try to influence this through their financial power. Many Regatous are skeptical towards this terrorist movement. Because they fear to become second-class citizens in case of a secession of the North, the ethnic minorities in the North support the central government in Ouacobani. The civil society in the North is completely fragmented along different lines/cleavages: pro or contra the independence of the North, pro or contra the Sharia. Each of the actors mentioned has supporters among the civil society.

The traditional authorities are less fragmented than the civil society. They are the only ones that have maintained a certain influence as they are still enjoying the respect of the population. The traditional authorities play an intermediary role between the different groups when negotiating the access to basic resources of the population (e.g. access to water).

The situation in the South is quite sensitive as well. The local population is increasingly disappointed by the inability of the former government to reestablish the situation, the laxity and the corruption of the political elite, a feeling of general uncertainty prevails. Little after the declaration of independence of the North, young members of the regular army launched a coup d'Etat against the Mabebunian government, accusing it of not allocating sufficient means to the military forces. This has further weakened the situation of the regular army in the North. The majority of the new junta is composed of young officers that are for the most part inexperienced in political affairs. In order to precipitate the return to the constitutional order and under pressure of the regional mediation lead by a neighboring country, they accepted yielding the power to a transitional government but at the same time remain a vital actor in the discussions around the transition.



The population and the civil society in the South are equally divided: some are in favor of the military coup d'Etat that represents a break with the former regime, others are against it. The transitional government and the formal authorities are lacking legitimacy and the constitution is suspended. As in the North, the traditional local authorities in the South experience a revitalization, as they are the only still functioning and respected institution. The international community has denounced the coup d'Etat and established an economic embargo entailing severe consequences for the population of Mabebuni. The economic development in all parts of the country has considerably slowed down since the embargo was imposed. The United States and France are still supporting the regular army of Mabebuni, as they want to support the fight against Islamist terrorism. The biggest problem of the average Mabebunian is however not linked to Islamist terrorism but relates to the food crisis, the insecurity, the corruption of the political elite and the economic crisis. The Mabebunians are disappointed by how the United States and France ignore their real needs and how, in their eyes, their territory is abused for the fight against terrorism.

The European Union is perceived as being more neutral in this context and as having less strong ties to the regular army. Until now, Switzerland has enjoyed high credibility in the context. The country has beenactive in supporting rural development, education, and good governance; Switzerland has also supported initiatives of political dialogue and mediation between the different actors of conflict. As the crisis intensified on both fronts, Swiss mediation efforts and particularly its financial support of an associative movement of actors in the North, some of whom maintain close links to the armed groups, have sparked strong criticism in Mabebuni's media. According to the media, Switzerland is not impartial anymore and has taken side in favor of those that advocate for the independence of the North. How these events impact on the Swiss development activities is not clear yet; so far it has lead to a certain cool-off of the contacts between the Swiss actors and the transitional government. Some Swiss projects are still going on, others were suspended. A more detailed evaluation of the situation will allow determining whether minor adaptations or more fundamental modifications of the programs are necessary.

#### The Rural Development Program

The rural development program has a budget of 5m CHF for the coming 2 years. The first goal of this project is to improve the food security and to strengthen the role of women in the rural sector. The project is implemented by CIVITAS, a Swiss NGO.

The program is located in the central region of Mabebuni, which is a very fertile region thanks to the adjacent river. There are many small agricultural enterprises, which all suffer from the decline of export possibilities; especially the export of cotton is severely affected. Due to the food crisis striking the country, the pressure on the central region to increase its productivity is very high. The region is close to the area controlled by the ACIN movement that has declared its independence not long ago.

The fact that pastoralists from the North migrate further down South and stay longer than they used to increases tensions. Access to land has not been very equitable in the past. The traditional authorities of the different

clans are regulating access to land and water; some are known for treating their clan preferentially. Traditionally, the women don't have access to land directly but only through their male relatives (father, husband, etc.). In this situation, the inflow of pastoralists from the North and the inequalities of access to land has become a risk for all agricultural activities. Recently, there have been violent encounters between residents and the nomads of the North. The traditional authorities were, however, able to calm the situation down.

Both, the representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture (MoAG) and the regional and local authorities are highly interested in this Rural and Development Program. It was the local authorities that chose the beneficiary Local Farmers Associations LFAs. In the eyes of the representatives of the central government this program should be a model that shows that the government is still present in the region and that it remains a credible partner. Governmental presence in this region is perceived as crucial as a tradition of strongly opposing the political elite of Ouacobani has developed here in the past, in reaction to incidents of ministers misappropriating international contributions designed for rural development programs that had come to light at several occasions. Because of the recent disputes between the pastoralists and the farmers, it had been decided to suspend the program until the situation would have calmed down.

### **Objectives of the Program**

- · Strengthening food security by increasing agricultural productivity;
- Strengthening the farmers' Local Farmers Associations LFAs;
- Strengthening the women economically as well as their role in the farmers' organizations;
- Long-term objective: make the LFAs able to manage their enterprises autonomously.

## Activities

- Establishing training centers and information centers on how to increase productivity for farmers that are members of the LFAs;
- · Technical training of the farmers;
- Capacity building of the SOPs regarding administration, communication, market analysis, leadership, search for finances, and advocacy;
- · Strengthening of the women's leadership in the SOPs;
- Strengthening women's access to land and women's access to finances

#### **Beneficiaries**

- · Direct: 400 families and 3 SOPs involved;
- · Indirect: 4 communities in the central region of Mabebuni.

#### Employees

10 internationals, 30 locals of which 10 people coming from the capital Ouacobani, and 8 belonging to the Dogou minority of the central region.
12 persons are employed as support staff such as drivers, security staff, etc. They are from the ethnic majority Riga of the central region.

#### **Partner Institutions**

- 10 SOPs of the region (only 3 receive direct support);
- 1 regional SOP (province);
- Traditional local authorities in the North (pastoralist) and South (farmers);
- · The Ministry of Agriculture (MoAG) and their local representatives;
- The women's association;
- · Private actors in this sector;
- · Pastoralists.

### Informal Education Project in the Northeast

The informal education project has a budget of 2m CHF for the coming 2 years. The main goal is to give young people including girls and young women that have not gone to school or had dropped out of school access to education. The project is implemented by Education without Borders (EWB), a Swiss NGO.

The education and the alphabetization have been identified as one of the biggest challenges regarding the development of the country, besides the socio-economic development. Particularly in the region in the North, bordering Kadalie, the literacy rate is lower than 25%; the female literacy rate is only 5%. The regions in the North have been neglected by the central government of Mabebuni in terms of equipment and investments when compared to other regions. There are few schools and a lack of teachers. A traditional life style according to the rules of the clans prevails.

The role of women is seen as mothers and wives, they are perceived as men's property and do not have the possibility to participate in the decisionmaking processes in the public life. Girls rarely go to school or quit school after primary education.

Since about six months, the Islamist Movement of Mabebuni (IMM) occupies the territory of the North. The IMM is an armed group that is strongly opposed to the transitional government of Ouacobani. They claim more socio-economic development in the North and advocate for the establishment of the Sharia in this part of the country. The IMM is against the independence of the North and is thus against the ACIN. In the past, there have been violent encounters between the ACIN and the IMM. The role of the SIQMA, particularly its ties to the ACIN and the IMM, are not very clear. Slowly but surely, the IMM's influence on the local authorities, the main partners of the project, seems to be growing. They decide how to manage the local affairs since the defeat of the regular army by the ACIN. The other partners of the project are the Teachers' Association (TA) and the National Fund for the Non- Formal Education (NFNFE).

The local and regional authorities are more and more influenced by the ideas of the IMM, particularly by their idea to establish the Sharia. The occupation of the region by the IMM and the combats that took place in the region not only aggravated the food situation but had also had negative effects on the freedom of expression and opportunities for political participation. Moreover, disappearances and arbitrary arrests have increased. Trust among the local people has vanished, as local power alliances are ever shifting in seemingly unpredictable ways. The project has been ongoing until now. The insecurity and the resistance of the local authorities have increased. Contrary to

the IMM who oppose the project, the traditional authorities of the Regatous who are against the establishment of the Sharia and the ethnic minorities continue to support the project. EWB has been active in the region for 20 years and is a respected actor. In order to guarantee a good communication between the EWB and the communities, EWB employs only Regatous and members of the ethnic minorities. The number of employed expats is very low due to the high insecurity and the risk of abductions.

Recently, there have been tensions and disputes between certain groups of employees, particularly between local employees working as security personnel and the drivers. They complained that they did not have sufficient security guarantees in the field where criminal groups are increasingly present, benefitting of the confuse situation. The international employees had reduced their visits to the field and only go accompanied by an armed escort.

#### **Objectives of the Project**

Young girls and boys that did not go to school so far gain access to an
education providing them with basic skills and knowledge (read, write,
mathematics, basic knowledge of health and hygiene) that will allow them
to take their own decisions in life, to develop professional activities and to
take part in the social and political life of their communities

#### Activities

- · Construction of 10 schools in remote communities;
- Basic training of teachers teaching in these remote communities. The gender aspect is very important; the training of female teachers is a priority;
- Special courses for girls and boys that had been 'forgotten' or excluded from the formal educational system;
- · Elaboration of pedagogical documents and the curricula;
- Strengthening of the Teachers' Association and the National Fund for Non-Formal Education.

#### **Beneficiaries**

- 1,500 youth that had not been going to school, of which 900 girls and young women;
- 10 remote communities.

#### Employees

- 30 local employees: due to the security situation all of them are men. 2 employees belong to the ethnic minority; they are responsible for planning and supervising the project. The other 28 are Regatous;
- 2 international employees that work in Ouacobani and travel at least once a month to the Northeast to supervise the project.

## **Partner Institutions**

- · Local authorities
- The Teachers' Association (TA)
- The National Fund for Non-Formal Education (NFNFE)

## CASE-STUDY SINALOA

#### Situation:

The Republic of SINALOA is a country with many provinces and the province of Galia has seen a 25-year guerilla war for independence of the Galia province. The rebel group claiming to represent all indigenous inhabitants of the region ask for the right to self-determination, the respect for their cultural identity with special emphasis on their own language, true possibilities for political participation and a fair distribution of resources and revenues generated in their area. The civil war between the rebel group and the central government was on-going when the Tsunami hit. At the time the civil war had come to halt and peace negotiations were underway. However, the outcome of the negotiations was not clear yet and wounds and traumas of both parties run deep.

Galia is a diverse region occupied by several ethnic and language groups. The major ethnic groups are the Galianese (who are distributed throughout Galia). Almost all inhabitant of the region are Buddhists, although of different branches with slightly different practices. Politically the Galia people of the area were mostly supporting the rebel groups.

The area is rich is natural resource, especially in terms of fossile resources such as oil and gas and is therefore generating high revenues. The coasts are the strongholds of the central government's marine corps, known to be especially fierce and merciless.

Galia has a large range of biodiversity and among the rarer large mammals are tigers and some other endangered species. At the same time the area has been suffering from deforestation since the 1970s. The central parts of the countries and areas removed from the main roads were less controlled by the central government and the rebels were said to have their bases close to the mountains. Rural populations were often subjected to intense interrogation and sweeping by the military since they were suspected to have contact with rebels (voluntary or not) and support them.

Due to the conflict, the economic and health situation was very difficult. For years movement was restricted and the military was in control over most economic activities. Criminal networks had profited from the civil war and the lack of a functioning judicial system. The province Galia had become a centre for the illegal arms trade, drug trade and other smuggling activities.




The town of Battica is located on the coastline and many surrounding villages are within a few kilometres of the shore. Battica had only to a limited degree been affected by the conflict, mainly because of the presence and the vicinity of the military bases. The inhabitants of Battica town were therefore not heavily affected by the conflict as long as they did not move to other parts of the area.

The highlands and inland areas were seen as the stronghold of the rebel groups but were not affected by the tsunami. During the war, the highlands also saw the emergence of civilian militias that sided with the Sinaloa government forces, which received financial and military aid from the Sinaloa military, and were fighting the rebels. Moreover, the highlands are also home to ethnic minorities, such as the Epita, who have always been itching for more recognition.

The Sinaloa administration was seen as quite legitimate in the bigger cities and village chiefs were also quite respected by their communities. The traditional authorities and especially the (traditional) community-based organisations had a lot of influence as they were enjoying the respect of the population and fulfilling important social roles. There were hardly any civil society organisations in the area apart from these community based organisations and generally civil society was fragmented along the different lines/ cleavages: pro or contra the independence of the Galia province.

#### The Impact of the Tsunami:

The earthquake damaged buildings and roads and the subsequent tsunami destroyed almost all structures along the coast, flooding areas up to 2 kilometres inland. The train station and land routes to other major towns had been severely damaged. The native population of the area outside Battica are mainly poor farmers, living in traditional bamboo houses. Due to the conflict, for centuries hardly any development had arrived in these villages and infrastructure was in very poor shape. The inland villages have not been destroyed by the Tsunami but some suffered from the earthquake. Also the environment and landscape had changed and recently floods or draughts and pests were frequent. The farmers were traditionally planting rice and also cultivated vegetables and coconuts but harvested very little yield since the Tsunami.




The Battica town before and after Tsunami. Due to the flooding and changed landscape, large parts of the coastline were not suitable for housing anymore. Former inhabitants had to be relocated to another area.

#### The project

Oxaid International had been implementing a post-Tsunami reconstruction project for 3 years. Inhabitants of the coast were relocated close to Ampala, a farming village 8 km inland. The number of families living in the farming village was only about 150 people before the conflict and also before the Tsunami. 95 % of the native Ampala inhabitants earned their income in the agricultural sector, the rest are government employees and other sectors. Because of the conflict and also the Tsunami, many people fled to the Ampala, living with their relatives or in temporary shelter camps. In the meantime - those who can - have spontaneously returned to their native villages. The population relocated by the project were several hundred men and women -mainly fishermen and some government officials - from Battica town. The relocated men and women were not pleased to be removed from the seashore, their boats and their former environment

In the beginning relocated people were living in temporary shelters, which were gradually replaced by permanent concrete houses. The building and reconstruction of housing had been making good progress and reconstruction activities were close to completion.



#### **Project:**

- WHERE: 8 km inland, on "unused" land, close to a farming community. When the Tsunami victims first arrived, the population and the village chief spontaneously welcomed the new settlers as new citizens of Ampala
- WHAT: roughly 700 new houses for Tsunami victims

#### Beneficiaries: the criteria for the selection of beneficiaries:

- Lost their houses due to the Tsunami
- · Displaced and cannot settle in the old location close to the beach

The Oxaid team was sensitive to the different needs of the Tsunami victims. To achieve higher sustainability and to support the relocated population in their new location, a livelihood component had been added to the reconstruction activities.

The livelihood program is still in the preparation phase. However the basic programming decisions were made already.

- Market
- Waste management
- School
- · Football field
- Sewage

## Staff:

5 internationals, 12 locals of which 10 people were coming from the capital of Sinaloa and 2 belonging to the Aksu minority of a far away province. 7 persons are employed as support staff such as drivers, security staff, etc. Most are ethnic Gaianese and others are form other neighbouring provinces. As an INGO Oxaid had trouble finding adequate personnel for its operations and therefore had a high staff turnover.

## Partners

Different departments of the municipal government of Battica Construction companies

## Challenge:

In this situation Oxaid suddenly got to know that the some settlers wanted to leave their new houses and were looking for possibilities to move back into Battica. Also the Village chief of Ampala started to complain about the settlers and the project. At the same time Oxaid staff was increasingly reluctant to go to the field, as they did not feel welcome in the area anymore. Finally violence broke out and the authorities had to move in.



## EXAMPLES STEP 1-3

## GUATEMALA

grievances.

| GUATEMALA   |   |  |  |
|---|---|--|--|
| STEP 1  |   | STEP 2   |  |
| SOT/CE  | Actors  |  |  |
| SOT 1: Unclear<br>borders between<br>municipalities   | Municipal governments   | OVERAL GOAL: Enhance citizen participation<br>and good governance of the municipal govern-<br>ment in the management of natural resources<br>(forest) of the municipalities  |  |
| CE: All involved mu-<br>nicipalities are really<br>keen on resolving the<br>border conflicts,<br>SOT 1: Unclear<br>borders between<br>municipalities  | Municipal governments   | ACTIVITY 1: "Identify and train community lead-<br>ers to undertake forest management of municipal<br>forests"   |  |
| SOT 2: Non-state<br>armed groups<br>claiming access to<br>protected forest.<br>GOV PROBLEMS:<br>• The local govern-<br>ment is not serving<br>all community<br>members equally<br>• The local govern-<br>ment does not pro-<br>vides security for all.<br>(the local govmt has<br>no authority over the<br>armed group).<br>• The local govern-<br>ment is only to a<br>limited degree trans-<br>parent and account-<br>able to all?<br>• Relevant institutions<br>do not take up local | Municipal government,<br>armed group (one ex-<br>tended family / criminal<br>network) | INTERNAL COMMUNICATION: The local staff<br>was having huge problems with one armed group<br>and got threatened. Staff thought that it was in<br>their responsibility to handle the problem and did<br>not search help from the management. |  |

## STEP 3

## **Options/measures**

Reassess the geographical coverage of

Consider supporting the process of reviewing the borders between municipalities.

Design training concept with community leaders of two municipalities that takes the conflict into account.

Staff asked for a higher number of security staff and for more training in conflict resolution and to the fact that management was informed too late, the requests could not be granted. Consider supporting the process of reviewing based multi stakeholder process.

Comments

It is not clear where the borders of the different municipalities are. Some communities are located the project. in contested areas. This hinders the functioning of the project, proper citizen participation in the management of natural resources and creates tensions.

The forest management in general is affected by a lot of power-play and even fighting between the different municipal authorities. Since the municipal border delimitations are not clear, some communities are not clearly belonging to one or the other municipality. Furthermore, the forest allocation is not clear; some municipalities claim that only their own community members have access. This might restrict community participation in natural resource management and/or slow down the project implementation. Staff tried to discuss with the armed group directly to stop the cutting of protected forest. This resulted in increased security threats for staff mediation. This was not in the budget and due members, which were engaged in this effort.

The local govmt as the main partner needs support in GG and citizens should have better access the borders between municipalities in a broadto information and participation. Especially the difficult security situation needs attention

## INDONESIA

| STEP 1  |  | STEP 2   |
|---|--|--|
| SOT/CE  | Actors   |  |
| SOT 1: General distrust<br>and fear<br>SOT 2: Fishermen eot<br>new houses, football<br>fields and other benefits.<br>- The local government<br>does not provide secu-<br>rity for all. (3) (farmers<br>trust GAM, Fishermen<br>trust the national army)<br>- The local government<br>is only partly transpar-<br>ent and accountable to<br>all? (3)<br>- Relevant institutions do<br>not fully take up local<br>grievances. (1) | Supporters of Gol (fish-<br>ermen) and supporter of<br>GAM (farmers) | SELECTION OF BENEFICIARIES: "Those<br>displaced by the Tsunami" (accidentally almost<br>exclusively fishermen) |
|   |  |  |

| STEP 1  |                                     | STEP 2  |  |
|---|-------------------------------------|---|--|
| SOT/CE  | Actors                              |   |  |
| SOT 1: Violent conflict<br>about the control over<br>the Tamil areas. | LTTE and Government<br>of Sri Lanka | INFORMATION: Due to the political situation<br>it is difficult to access the LTTE-controlled<br>areas which are large areas in the north and<br>east of Sri Lanka where your projects are |  |

## HINDUKUSH

| STEP 1                    |                        | STEP 2  |  |
|---------------------------|------------------------|---|--|
| SOT/CE                    | Actors                 | OFFICE RENT: The office of the organisation     |  |
| SOT 1: Disputes over ac-  | Clans, Warlords, Busi- | was rented from a businessman, which was not    |  |
| cess to natural resources | nessmen, Government    | well known to the staff before the contract was |  |
| SOT 2: Different armed    |                        | signed.   |  |
| groups claiming political |                        |   |  |
| rights                    |                        |   |  |
| SOT 1: Conflicts over ac- |                        | DONOR: Discussions about leaving or not         |  |
| cess to natural resources |                        | from an area that is heavily affected by insur- |  |
| SOT 2: Different armed    |                        | gents which themselves also provide help for    |  |
| groups claiming political |                        | the population.                                 |  |
| rights                    |                        |   |  |
| SOT 3: Increased pres-    |                        |   |  |
| ence of armed groups      |                        |   |  |
| and less presence of      |                        |   |  |
| Government                |                        |   |  |

#### Comments

STEP 3

The support for fishermen could further increase the conflict between the fishermen and farmers. The ones who are generally in support of the government get the support, the others (suspicious of the Govmt) don't. This could even provoke conflict not only at the grass-root level but at the level of decision makers on the two sides.

## **Options/measures**

- Design common/shared infrastructure and shared maintenance of it.
- Involve traditional community based organisations.

#### Comments

The information coming from the LTTE-areas are mainly from the organisation's office staff, which is still based in the east. However, they have to be very careful with the information they are sharing over the phone or email. It is only possible to get first-hand information from the staff when they come to the capital Colombo. Information from local authorities (GoSL) as well as well as from LTTE-close sources run a high risk to be biased

#### STEP 3

## **Options/measures**

- Look for independent sources of information.
- Organise more trips for staff to Colombo.
- Look for secure communications channels.

#### Comments

ficking networks.

## STEP 3

#### **Options/measures**

- Find a new office.
- Discuss possible landlords with partners/interlocuteurs before renting.
- If the organisation is leaving it is sending the implicit message is that the local population is left alone in a difficult situation. This might create anger and frustration amongst beneficiaries and the staff who have taken a lot of risks to keep the project going.

The office was attacked. Later it became clear

that the businessman was linked to criminal traf-

## - Communicate as early as possible and as widely and broadly as possible.

- Efficient project implementation is often difficult; communicate that transparently and proactively too.
- Publicly express that the organisation is aware of the risks and is ready to bear increased costs and be more flexible up to a certain extent.

## NEPAL

| STEP 1  |   | STEP 2   |
|---|---|--|
| SOT/CE  | Actors  |  |
| SOT: Discrimination<br>is a root cause of<br>conflict.<br>GOV PROBLEMS:<br>- The local govern-<br>ment does not pro-  | Maoist and the GoN<br>(related to DAG- disad-<br>vantaged groups) | STAFF (AWARENESS): Staff feeling under a lot of pressure   |
| vide security for all.<br>(Maoists only to the  |   | DONOR: wants us to retreat from Maoist areas   |
| Maoists villages)<br>- The local govern-<br>ment is not very<br>transparent and   |   | EXTERNAL LOCAL COMMUNICATION: Difficul-<br>ties to decide who to invite to what occasion and<br>what information to reveal |
| accountable to all.<br>- No institutions are<br>available to take up<br>local grievances.   |   |  |
| CE: Collaborative<br>development of<br>consensus on the<br>definition of DAG<br>and agreement on<br>giving priorities to<br>them by all parties/<br>stakeholders. |   | COMMUNICATION: Maoists' wide-ranging suspi-<br>cious of NGOS   |
|   |   | ACTIVITY: "Create awareness for the right to access to health, water and education."                                       |
| SOT: Constant mutu-   |   | ACTIVITY: Massive material input for the building of irrigation systems  |
| al suspicion towards<br>other groups/per-   |   |  |
| sons of benefitting<br>more from a project<br>SOT: Only the voices<br>of the elites are<br>heard  |   | INFORMATION / COMMUNICATION: When anal-<br>ysis are conducted, Brahmins are ALWAYS pre-<br>sent                            |

|  | STEP 3   |
|--|--|
| Comments   | Options/measures   |
| Some staff try to prove too hard that they are able<br>to work under difficult conditions. They neglect<br>their stress and fear and do not dare to ask for<br>support               | <ul> <li>Massive support from the management</li> <li>Ensure ENOUGH LOCAL-LOCAL STAFF</li> <li>Carefully consider the way vacant positions are<br/>advertised (Low casts, will look who is already<br/>hired and may not even apply)</li> <li>Assure staff, that they do not have to be too<br/>bold!</li> </ul>   |
| If we retire, we neglect the rights of the DAG and<br>we abandon our primary stakeholders  | Development of BOG, together with 14 donors,<br>GoN, and Maoists<br>External communication is a sensitive topic, not<br>completely resolved in Nepal, wording always<br>very carefully selected!   |
| Maoists ask NGO for Info's and consider staff as spies   | <ul> <li>Very high skills of the team are needed: Lots of capacity building for staff in open and transparent communication, facilitation and negotiation skills</li> <li>Not everybody can do these tasks, and not everybody should either! PCM regulations may not be upheld (remote monitoring).</li> <li>Adapt Modus operandi; extensive discussions via interlocutors to lower distrust.</li> </ul> |
| Maoists do not want the NGO to create aware-<br>ness on these issues, as the NGOs promotion of<br>the Rights of disadvantaged competes with their<br>socialist political propaganda. | <ul> <li>Adapt Modus operandi; extensive discussions<br/>with all stakeholders via interlocutors to lower<br/>distrust.</li> </ul>   |
| Transparency is key to reduce suspicions and tensions.   | <ul> <li>Develop a tool to ensure transparency and<br/>accountability (Public Audit Practice - PAP)</li> <li>Public Audits with a clear concept; who to<br/>invite, what to reveal,</li> </ul>   |
| DAG do not dare to speak, no voice for the disad-<br>vantaged  | - QUOTA for the constitution of groups and for executive functions (Women, Dalit, Janajati)  |

## QUICK ASSESSMENT OF FRAGILITY AND CONFLICT

## **Checklist for Program Strategies, Project Proposals and ProDocs**

Fragile and conflict affected situations do not require entirely different development projects but they require a different approach which recognizes political and security challenges. When insecurity prevails, the political, social, economic and cultural environment is unstable and prone to unexpected changes, harmful cleavages in society put social cohesion at risk. Therefore a tailored approach (The 3-Steps approach for WFCS) to analyze, react on and to take decisions, which take the unstable and (potentially) violent context into account is necessary.

The aim of the approach is to avoid a possible negative impact for instance by involuntarily exacerbating existing tensions and to foster a positive impact on the fragile and conflict context. According to OECD-DAC<sup>44</sup> Guidelines as well as most main international actors this is a minimal standard for all international cooperation in fragile and conflict-affected contexts.

The checklist serves to • summarize specific information to provide a basis for decision-making, • supports the mainstreaming of conflict sensitivity and • to monitor performance of adaptation to the fragile and conflict affected situation to the respective desk for knowledge management and strategy development.

| Country: | Project name and Number / Country Strategy: | Date: |
|----------|---|-------|
|          |   |       |

## A. FRAGILITY

Statehood or on the contrary "fragility" is manifest in three areas: (In-)Effectiveness of state functions, authority over use of force, and legitimacy. The more a state provides goods and services to its citizens (effectiveness), the more it enforces a legimate monopoly on the use of force (authority). The more it allows for civil and political rights and is accepted by the people as legitimate (legitimacy), the more stable and functioning it is<sup>45</sup>. Considerable deficits in these areas lead to a fragile situation.

→ Please discuss your countries' or your regions' situation here.

| Question                           | Countrywide         | Project region      |  |
|------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--|
| Can the context be considered      | (1=no, 5=very much) | (1=no, 5=very much) |  |
| a fragile and/or conflict affected | 1 2 3 4 5           | 1 2 3 4 5           |  |
| situation?46                       |                     |                     |  |
| Comments                           |                     |                     |  |

Authority/ Security-Gap

Ineffectiveness/ Capacity-Gap Repression Legitimacy-Gap

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> Adapted from Call (2010) in: "State Fragility: Towards a Multi-Dimensional Empirical Typology". DIE, Discussion Paper 3/2012

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup> If not sure please refer to the WFCS Manual for links to common Fragility Indexes or select one here: Fund For Peace, Political Instability Index, Global Peace Index, Worldwide Governance Indicators (see Hyperlinks in the document)

## **B. CONFLICT**

| Question<br>What are the main Sources of<br>Tensions in the context of the<br>program/project?  | Countrywide<br>SOT<br>1.<br>2.<br>3.       | Project region<br>SOT<br>1.<br>2.<br>3. |
|---|--|---|
| What are the main Connecting<br>Elements in the context of the<br>program/project?  | CE<br>1.<br>2.<br>3.                       | CE<br>1.<br>2.<br>3.                    |
| Who are the key driving actors of conflict?<br>Who are the bridge-builders?   | Actors fuelling tensions<br>1.<br>2.<br>3. | Bridge-builders<br>1.<br>2.<br>3.       |
| Did/will the planning contain<br>a Sources of Tensions/SOT<br>and Connecting Elements /CE<br>analysis? (if "yes" fill in D= "Con-<br>text", if no explain why)<br>Does your monitoring and report-<br>ing system include information on<br>these issues?<br>Comments: |  |   |
| Commente.   |  |   |

## C. Interactions and links between the Program and the fragile/conflict context (if applicable)

| How is the planned intervention       |
|---------------------------------------|
| interacting with the identified SOTs? |
| Please name potential links.          |
| How is the planned intervention       |
| interacting with the identified CEs?  |
| Please name potential links.          |
| Comments:                             |

## D. Operational consequences (measures or options to deal with fragility and conflict)

| Based on the outlined links, what are the opportunities to furthermore |  |
|--|--|
| strengthen connecting elements?  |  |
| Based on the outlined links, what are the main risks to fuel tensions? |  |
| Project ideas/components, which  |  |
| have to be put on hold because   |  |
| there is a risk to do harm?  |  |
| Comments:  |  |

## E. Mainstreaming

|  | yes | no |
|--|-----|----|
| Is sensitivity to fragile and conflict affected situations explained and |     |    |
| reflected in the strategy (of the proposed project)?                     |     |    |
| Are partners and staff assessed against criteria of sensitivity to       |     |    |
| fragility and conflict?  |     |    |
| Does the strategy take into account some flexibility in the budget       |     |    |
| to ensure potential program changes on a short notice due to the         |     |    |
| fragile and unstable context?  |     |    |
| Does the project contain ideas/components to prevent violent con-        |     |    |
| flict and promote conflict transformation (e.g. through strengthening    |     |    |
| connecting elements/CE)?   |     |    |
| Does the donor have a strategy for FCS-sensitive project manage-         |     |    |
| ment? (if applicable)  |     |    |
| Are the partners familiar with the topic of "Sensitivity to Fragile and  |     |    |
| Conflict-affected Situations"  |     |    |
| Comments:  |     |    |

# DIFFERENT FORMS OF VIOLENCE AND CONFLICT<sup>47</sup>

.....

| Country                           | Local intergroup conflict  | "Conventional" Political<br>conflict (contests for<br>state power or for auto-<br>nomy or independence)               | Widespread gang-<br>related violence                            | Organized crime or<br>trafficking with ac-<br>companying violence                                    | Local conflicts with<br>transnationale ideo-<br>logical connections       |
|-----------------------------------|--|---|---|--|---|
| Afghanistan                       | Multiple incidents involv-<br>ing militias including<br>Amanullah Khan and<br>Abdul Rashid Dostum<br>(2002-08) | Taliban, other actors<br>(2002-present)   | Warlordism<br>(2002-present)                                    | Opium production<br>and trafficking  | Al-Qaeda links with<br>Taliban  |
| Pakistan                          | Intratribal conflict<br>(2004-09)  | Pakistani Taliban<br>(2007-present); Ba-<br>lochistan separatists<br>(2004-present)                                   |   | Drug production and trafficking  | Cross-border ideo-<br>logical militant links                              |
| Mali                              | Rebel infighting (1994);<br>ethnic violence in Gao,<br>Kayes and Kindal re-<br>gions (1998-99)                 | Rebel groups in north-<br>ern Mali (1990-present)   |   | Transnational<br>trafficking of illicit<br>goods, principally<br>drugs and weapons                   | Al-Qaeda in the<br>Islamic Maghreb  |
| Papua<br>New Guinea               | Ethnic and tribal con-<br>flicts in the Highlands<br>(2001-present)  | Secessionist move-<br>ment (Bougainville<br>Revolutionary Army<br>(1989-2001)   | Urban crime and gang violence                                   | Human trafficking;<br>source and transit<br>point for illicit timber<br>trade                        |   |
| El Salvador                       |  | Rebel groups (1979-92)  | La Mara Salva<br>Trucha, La 18, La<br>Mao Mao and La<br>Maquina | Drug trafficking   |   |
| Kenya                             | Clan and ethnic group violence (2005-08)   | Election violence   | Widespread gang<br>activity (1980s-<br>present)                 | Drug trafficking hub,<br>particularly for heroin   |   |
| Tajikistan                        |  | Democratic and Islam-<br>ist opposition groups<br>(1992-96); Movement<br>for Peace in Tajikistan<br>(1998)            |   | Major transit country<br>for Afghan narcotics;<br>human trafficking                                  | Islamic Movement of<br>Uzbekistan   |
| Philippines                       | Local clan conflicts   | Muslim separatist<br>groups in Mindanao<br>(Moro Islamic Liberation<br>Front and Moro Na-<br>tional Liberation Front) |   | Kidnap for ransom;<br>human trafficking;<br>methamphetamine<br>source for East and<br>Southeast Asia | Al-Qaeda and Je-<br>maah Islamiyah links<br>with Abu Sayyaf<br>(Mindanao) |
| North Ireland<br>(United Kingdom) | Local tensions over<br>religion and economic<br>disparties underlie much<br>of the escalated violence          | Irish Republican Army<br>(IRA) (1971-98)  | Splinter groups of<br>IRA and Protestant<br>paramilitaries      | Drug trafficking<br>(amphetamines)   |   |

Sources: Lockhart and Glencorse 2010; Straus 2010; Demombynes 2010; Barron and Others 2010; Dinnen, Porter and Sage 2010; Europa Publications 2001; Economist Intelligence Unit 2010; Oxford Reference Online 2010; Uppsala University 2009b, 2009a; UNODC 2010b.

# PROGRAM LEVEL APPLICATION OF THE 3-STEPS APPROACH:

Strategic discussions on the basis of a national level conflict context analysis are highly recommended. The steps to analyse the context and the interaction between the conflict context and the organisation/program follows the 3-Steps logic.

These reflections are an on-going process and the following points should serve as a guideline.

## STEP 1:

- Conduct a (desk) conflict context analysis (country-level CONFLICT AND FRAGILITY analysis) or contract specialized expert to do the conflict context analysis.
- If necessary: make use of independent data as outlined in the box "Independent Sources of Information" AND "Fragile States' Indexes" ANNEX 17 &18 to get a balanced analysis of the macro-level situation.
- In the case of violence and conflict, identify the key driving factors of conflict and conduct Scenario/Trends analysis.
- 4. Look at the links to Human Rights issues

# STEP 2:

- State Theory(s) of Change<sup>48</sup> to be explicit about underlying assumptions about how change comes about that is, theories of how to achieve change.
- Consider organisational issues such as the composition of staff (minorities and gender) as well as the choice of approach regarding communication and security management.
- 7. Discuss the chosen partnership approach and how it relates to the context.

## STEP 3:

8. Explain the strategic orientation of your programme and discuss how this relates to the context and your Theories of Change (e.g. why you chose to focus on local governance and infrastructure, working with local councils and district government and having strong alliances with national level civil societz for advocacy). For the discussion of the program-approach, use the Table "Fragile states and suggested (policy) interventions" in Annex 19 and discuss especially the "Suggested HIS Priorities" Column.

<sup>48</sup> A theory of change model describes the linkage between project inputs, the implementation strategy and the intended outputs and outcomes. See: also www. theoryofchange.org

ANNEX

# ANNEX 17

# MONITORING & DATA COLLECTION IN CHALLENGING ENVIRONMENTS

Data collection in fragile and conflict-affected situations may be highly problematic and reliable data not easy to obtain. Another challenge is in the reliability, availability or accessibility of data to monitor. This is even more the case for disaggregated data. Whereas gender disaggregated data is often available, social exclusion and divisions or discrimination according to race, caste, ethnicity, region wealth or political affiliations are not easily accessible or hard to assess<sup>49</sup>. The same applies if the project is not easily accessible or the implementation is conducted exclusively through partners. A number of points to consider as well as ideas if data sources pose a problem

to the monitoring of a project or program (see also Step 2 of the 3-Steps):

- Be aware where the information comes fromInclude official sources where available
- Always triangulate
- If security and "access" are issues, select a local partner (who has access to the area) for the monitoring of the project
- · Involve private sector partners in the monitoring
- Invest in building-up data collection systems maybe in collaboration with other organisations or donors
- · Involve beneficiaries in the collection of data
- Try to disaggregate relevant data from the beginning of the project (e.g. social, political, ethnic, race, caste affiliations, according to the SOTs and CEs)
- · Work with perception surveys and opinion polls
- · Use mobile phone technology to collect and transmit data
- Use panels of experts to regularly review projects
- · Use independent sources of information
- · Combine different approaches of monitoring and data collection
- · Plan for evaluation and post-evaluation

BOX: Additional independent sources of information

*This may be sensitive, be conflict sensitive! See also– CRISE*<sup>50</sup> *and Fragile States Indexes for data.* 

<sup>49</sup> See Policy on Gender and Social Equity

50 http://www.crise.ox.ac.uk/

- Human Rights Watch (HRW) http://www.hrw.org/de
- · International Crisis Group (ICG) http://www.crisisgroup.org/
- Afrobarometer perception survey data from several African states http://www.afrobarometer.org/
- SIPRI Military expenditure data http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4
- CRISE social equity and exclusion: http://www.crise.ox.ac.uk/partnershq.shtml
- Corruption Perceptions Index Transparency Internationals global perception survey of corruption http://www.transparency.org/policy\_research/surveys\_indices/cpi/2009/cpi\_2009\_table
- Freedom in the World comparative assessment of global political rights and civil liberties http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=505
- IFPRI Landgrabbing map: http://maps.google.com/maps/ms?ie=UTF8& source=embed&oe=UTF8&msa=0&msid=100237997621038330776.00 0468b0a95f89721a96e
- Interaktive Weltkarte zum Ausverkauf von Ackerland http://www.inkota. de/nc/themen-kampagnen/welternaehrung-landwirtschaft/land-grabbing/interaktive-weltkarte/#c5068
- Ibrahim Index of African Governance includes indicators on Safety and Rule of Law; Participation and
- Human Rights; Sustainable Economic Opportunity; and Human Development http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/en/section/the-ibrahim-index
- Open Budget Index measures budget transparency and accountability http://internationalbudget.org/who-does-budget-work/
- UN Statistics Division wide range of data including MDG<sup>s</sup>, economic, social, and environmental indicators http://data.worldbank.org/indicator
- Uppsala Conflict Data rigorous data on numbers of conflict deaths http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/search.php
- Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) http://www.internaldisplacement.org/countries/ethiopia

# FRAGILE STATES' INDEXES

## Selected easy to use indexes:

| Index   | Address  | Specific approach  |
|---|--|--|
| Failed States Index   | http://ffp.statesindex.org   | Comprehensive global overview with<br>clear ranking and trend. It is possible<br>to look at separate relevant vari-<br>ables, such as "legitimacy of state",<br>"progressive deterioration of public<br>services", "poverty", "sharp or severe<br>economic decline", "uneven eco-<br>nomic development", "vengeance-<br>seeking group grievance" or "rise of<br>factionalized elites", among other<br>relevant criteria.             |
| Global Peace Index  | http://www.visionofhumanity.<br>org/#/page/indexes/global-<br>peace-index                    | Good overview  |
| Political Instability Index   | http://viewswire.eiu.<br>com/site_info.asp?info_<br>name=instability_<br>map&page=noads&rf=0 | Good overview  |
| Country Policy and Institu-<br>tional Assessment (CPIA)<br>WORLD BANK | http://data.worldbank.org/<br>indicator  | For specific information: Very com-<br>prehensive list indicators, covering<br>all major areas of development<br>from agriculture to social develop-<br>ment. Useful only for more detailed<br>macro and statistical data on specific<br>countries.  |
| Worldwide Governance<br>Indicators                                    | http://info.worldbank.org/<br>governance/wgi/index.asp                                       | Aggregate and individual govern-<br>ance indicators for 213 for six dimen-<br>sions of governance: Voice and Ac-<br>countability, Political Stability and<br>Absence of Violence, Government<br>Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality,<br>Rule of Law, Control of Corrup-<br>tion<br>Very useful is the possibility to<br>compare different variables against<br>other factors, such as "accountability<br>& voice" related to "income". |

# TABLE: FRAGILE STATES AND SUGGESTED (POLICY) INTERVENTIONS<sup>51</sup>

| Group (typical countries)                                   | Character   | Priority goal   | Character of external<br>support  | Suggested HIS Priorities (based on<br>Lessons Learned)  |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| A/E/L:<br>(Chad, DR<br>Congo, Sudan<br>etc.)                | Extremely low levels<br>in all three dimen-<br>sions:<br>authority, capacity<br>and legitimacy  | Focus on the<br>provision of basic<br>security first. Then<br>bring quick socioeco-<br>nomic gains and/or<br>establish the basics<br>of legitimate politics<br>(debated!) | Broad-based interna-<br>tional engagement;<br>peacebuilding and state-<br>building                                  | <ul> <li>→ Work on basic needs at local level</li> <li>→ Strengthen voice and local account-<br/>ability</li> <li>→ Provide space for dialogue and<br/>collaborative efforts between citizens<br/>(including organized civil society)<br/>and between citizens and state</li> <li>DO NOT: ignore conflicting interests<br/>and rifts in society</li> </ul>  |
| A/E/L +:<br>Rep. Congo,<br>Uganda, Kenya<br>etc             | Mostly very low<br>levels of capacity but<br>also relatively low on<br>authority; diverse,<br>though mostly at<br>the lower end, on<br>legitimacy |   | Offer support for capac-<br>ity, yet encourage (or<br>demand) better govern-<br>ance based on broader<br>legitimacy | <ul> <li>→ Multistakeholder approaches may be especially effective</li> <li>→ Work with change agents AND duty bearers</li> <li>→ Strengthen accountability mechanisms at both sides of the equation</li> <li>→ Strengthen voice</li> <li>→ Lobbying and advocacy maybe important for effective policy formulation and implementation (pro-poor policies)</li> <li>DO NOT: work on empowerment of right-holders only without strengthening capacities of government (duty-bearers)</li> </ul> |
| E: Madagascar,<br>Ghana, Burkina<br>Faso etc.               | Very low levels of<br>capacity, but decent<br>authority and above<br>average legitimacy   | •   | Alignment with country<br>system and local priori-<br>ties ("Paris Agenda")   | <ul> <li>→ Assist in the implementation of policies</li> <li>→ Deepening democracy interventions</li> <li>DO NOT: strengthen parallel systems or misalign with national policies</li> </ul>   |
| A: Algeria,<br>Venezuela, the<br>Dominican<br>Republic etc. | Decent capacity,<br>yet high levels of<br>violence  | Prevent violence;<br>invest in<br>constructive state-<br>society<br>relations   | State-building and gov-<br>ernance support based<br>on meaningful political<br>dialogue; coordination<br>essential  | <ul> <li>→ Work with change agents AND duty bearers</li> <li>→ Strengthen accountability mechanisms at both sides of the equation</li> <li>→ Provide space for dialogue and collaborative efforts between citizens, and between citizens and state on security needs</li> <li>DO NOT: ignore conflicting interests and rifts in society</li> </ul>  |
| L: Tunisia, Belarus,<br>Egypt etc.                          | Good authority and<br>decent capacity, but<br>mostly lower levels<br>of legitimacy  | More legitimate rule  | legitimate governance<br>unless and until opportu-<br>nity for a broad engage-<br>ment opens up                     | <ul> <li>→ Work with change agents</li> <li>→ Strengthen accountability mechanisms</li> <li>→ Strengthen capacities of legislative government (councils, parliament)</li> <li>→ DO NOT: strengthen executive government if there is a risk of reinforcing authoritarian regimes</li> </ul>  |
| Thapica from. 501   | Srannsnon, Sebe   | istran Liaja , mone .   |   |   |

<sup>51</sup> See: Jorn Gravingholt, Sebastian Ziaja, Merle Kreibaum. 2012. "State fragility: towards a multi-dimensional empirical typo-logy". German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE).

ANNEX

### ANNEX 20

# LINK TO HUMAN RIGHTS HUMAN RIGHTS BASED APPROACH (HRBA) AND GENDER

The issue of Human Rights is closely linked with Conflict and Fragility. The 3-Steps approach WFCS is an analytical framework to reduce complexity and make us aware of the influence of projects on the conflict context (and the other way round). The HRBA<sup>52</sup> approach is a conceptual framework which is normatively based on international human rights standards and builds a common basis for harmonising and guiding development efforts. To relate the Conflict Context Analysis to the Human Rights Framework, the list of Rights below can serve as a checklist to compare it with the Sources of Tensions in Step 1 of the Manual to "reformulate" them. At the same time the HRBA Principles • Universality and indivisibility, • Non-discrimination and equality, • Accountability<sup>53</sup> and Rule of Law, • Participation and inclusion can be taken to asses some of the GOV factors.

| Universal Human Rights   | Examples for gender dimensions <sup>54</sup>  |
|--|---|
| a. Right to Life, Liberty and Security<br>Right to livelihood and dignity<br>Right not to be deprived of liberty,<br>except in accordance with the law<br>Protection of physical integrity | <ul> <li>Afghanistan, DR Congo, Pakistan, India and Somalia are the worst places to be women.</li> <li>An estimated 3.9 million women below the age of 60 are missing every year. About two-fifths of them are never born, one-fifth goes missing in infancy and childhood, and the remaining two-fifths do so between the ages of 15 and 59</li> </ul> |
| <ul> <li>b. Right to Sanitation (closely linked)</li> <li>Safety</li> <li>Cultural Adequacy</li> </ul>   | <ul> <li>Girls between the ages of 1-5 are much ore vulnerable to<br/>bad hygiene conditions than boys.</li> </ul>  |
| c. Right to Food<br>Availability<br>Adequacy<br>Accessibility<br>Affordability<br>Stability of food supply   | Women very often eat the leftovers after men have eaten.  |
| d. Right to Education<br>Availability<br>Accessibility<br>Acceptability<br>Adaptability  | <ul> <li>In many developing countries only middle and upper-class<br/>women reach secondary class.</li> <li>In Ethiopia female literacy is at 34%.</li> </ul>   |
| e. Right to Health<br>Includes underlying determinants of<br>health (nutrition, housing, etc.)<br>Availability<br>Accessibility<br>Acceptability & Quality                                 | <ul> <li>Reproductive health is crucial for women</li> <li>In some ex-soviet countries men are vulnerable to heart-<br/>attack due to alcoholism.</li> </ul>  |
| f. Right to Housing<br>Legal security of tenure<br>Availability of infrastructure<br>Habitability<br>Accessibility   | <ul> <li>Equal land tenure is still a largely unresolved issue.</li> </ul>  |

#### 

<sup>53</sup> See the links in Annex 22 on Public Audit Practice and Downward Accountability

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup> See HELVETAS Swiss Intercooperation Issue Sheet on HRBA (hyperlink)

<sup>54</sup> See also WDR 2012 "Gender Equality and Development"

#### g. Rights of Minorities

- Equality before the law and nondiscrimination Right to profess and practice one's religion (also freedom of religion)
- h. Right to Culture Right to enjoy one's own culture Right to use one's own language
- i. Political Rights and Freedoms Effective exercise requires access to information Right to participate
  - Freedom of opinion/assembly/ etc. Non-discrimination
  - Right to a fair trial

• The right to vote, the right to political representation and the right to stand for office must be guaranteed for women too.

## ANNEX 21

## RESOURCE TRANSFERS AND IMPLICIT ETHICAL MESSAGES<sup>55</sup>

#### → Most of the RT and IEM are reflected in Step 2 of the 3-Steps approach

Assistance is a vehicle for providing resources to people who need them. Assistance's most direct impacts on conflict are a result of the introduction of resources (food, health care, training, shelter, improved water systems, etc.) into conflicts. Assistance resources represent both wealth and power in situations where these matter in intergroup struggle. What resources are provided, how they are distributed and to whom, and who decides about these matters all affect the economy of war (or peace) and intergroup competition or collaboration.

#### Theft

• Very often assistance good are stolen by warriors to support the war effort either directly (a when food is stolen to feed fighters, or indirectly (as when food is stolen and sold in order to raise money to buy weapons).

## Market Effects

 Assistance affects prices, wages, and profits and can either reinforce the war economy (enriching activities and people that war-related) or the peace economy (reinforcing "normal" civilian production, consumption, and exchange).

Distributional Effects

 When assistance is targeted to some groups and not to others, and these groups exactly (or even partially) overlap with the divisions represented in the conflicts assistance can reinforce and exacerbate conflict. Assistance can also reinforce connectors by crossing and linking groups by the way it is distributed.

Substitution Effects

 Assistance can substitute for local resources that would have been used to meet civilian needs and, thus, free these up to be used in support of war. There is a political substitution effect that is equally important. This occurs when international; agencies assume responsibility for civilian survival to such an extent that this allows local leaders and warriors to define their roles solely on in terms of warfare and control through violence. As the assistance agencies take on support of non-war aspects of life, such leaders can increasingly abdicate responsibility for these activities.

#### Legitimization Effects

• Assistance legitimizes some people and some actions and weakens or side-lines others. It can support either those people and actions that pursue war, or those that pursue and maintain nonwar (peace).

#### Implicit Ethical Messages

 Assistance also affects conflict environments through IMPLICIT ETHICAL MESSAGES. These are the impacts that assistance workers feel their own actions and attitudes have on conflict. They include the ways that assistance workers operate to reinforce the modes and moods of warfare or, alternatively, to establish non-conflictual relations, mutual respect and intergroup collaboration.

<sup>55</sup> Source: Collaborative for Development Action. 2004: DO NO HARM PROJECT:

The "Do No Harm" Framework for Analyzing the Impact of Assistance on Conflict: A Handbook.

Arms and Power

 When international agencies hire armed guards to protect their goods from theft or their workers from harm, the implicit ethical message perceived by those in the context is that it is legitimate for arms to determine who gets access to food and medical supplies and that security and safety drive from weapons.

Disrespect, Mistrust, Competition among Assistance Agencies

- When agencies refuse to cooperate with each other, and even worse "bad mouth" each other, the message received by those in the area is that it is unnecessary to cooperate with anyone with whom one does not agree. Further, you don't have to respect or work with people you don't like.
- Assistance Workers and Impunity
- When assistance workers use the goods and support systems for their own pleasures and purposes the message is that if one has control over resources, it is permissible to use them for personal benefit without being accountable to anyone else.

**Different Value for Different Lives** 

• When agencies adopt differential policies for two groups of people (e.g. expatriate and local staff) or act in ways to suggest that some lives (and even some goods) are more valuable than other lives, they present a message similar to that in warfare.

Powerlessness

 When field-based staff disclaim responsibility for the impacts of their assistance programmes, the message received is that individuals in complex circumstances cannot have much power and, thus, they do not have to take responsibility.

Belligerence, Tension, Suspicion

- When assistance workers are nervous and worried for their own safety, they can approach situations with suspicions and belligerence and their interactions with people can reinforce the modes of warfare and heighten tension. The message received is that power is, indeed, the broker of human interactions and it is normal to approach everyone with suspicion and belligerence.
- Publicity
- When international agencies use publicity pictures that emphasize the gruesomeness of warfare and the victimization of parties, they can also reinforce the demonization of one side. The message is that there are victims and criminals in warfare, while in most wars individuals act both criminally and kindly and both sides perpetrate atrocities and suffer victimization. Reinforcing the sense that there are "good" and "bad" sides in war can reinforce the motivations of people to push for victory and excuse their own behaviour.

# ANNEX 22

# LINKS REFERENCES

#### Further tools for Conflict Analysis:

For an overview over different tools for conflict analysis see also SDC on Conflict Analysis Tools: http://www.deza.admin.ch/index.php?navID=92682 &langID=6&userhash=50a90710be0566b9a7ab5179670b0387

#### Social Accountability and Downward Accountability:

See HELVETAS Swiss Intercooperation Issue Sheets on Public Audit Practice (LINK) and Downward Accountability (LINK) or the movie of the HELVETAS Nepal team on Public Audit Practice: http://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=Q3SEzw\_bPII

#### **Power Analysis:**

If you would like to analyze the relationships between stakeholders further, one promising approach is the power cube. http://www.powercube.net/

#### Local Governance Assessment:

The tool was developed by SHARIQUE project, implemented by HELVETAS Swiss Intercooperation in Bangladesh http://www.sdc.org.bd/ressources/re-source\_en\_167178.pdf

#### **Political Economy Analysis:**

Political economy analysis looks at power and interests. It analyzes social and political processes as the outcome of struggles for control over resources and positions. So far PEA has mainly been applied on the macro level. See http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/PO58.pdf or http://www.gsdrc.org/index.cfm?objectid=5973CC04-14C2-620A-27259789358C5D09, http://www.sdc-learningandnetworking-blog.admin.ch/tag/political-economy-analysis/, http://www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/stabilisation-and-conflict-resources/thematic/doc\_details/73-political-economy-analysis-how-to-note.html

#### Do No Harm

If you would like to find more information on Do No Harm, a wealth of information can be found from different sources e.g. the original CDA page http:// www.cdainc.com/cdawww/default.php or the SDC toolkits: http://www.deza. admin.ch/index.php?navID=92682&langID=6&userhash=50a90710be0566 b9a7ab5179670b0387

#### Tools to assess strategies and impacts of conflict transformation projects

Peace is hard to measure but a number of initiatives have taken up the challenge to assess whether they are making an impact with their conflict transformation projects. If you wish to explore this further please look at the Reflecting on Peace Practice Project (RPP): http://www.cdainc.com/cdaw-ww/project\_profile.php?pid=RPP&pname=Reflecting%20on%20Peace%20 Practice

Another elaborate source to design, measure and assess Conflict Transformation projects is the Search for Common Ground Manual: http://www.sfcg. org/programmes/ilr/ilt\_manualpage.html

#### Different approaches to conflict resolution

Strategies and approaches to Conflict Resolution ARBITRATION: Neutral 3rd par

- 1. Through the decision of the conflicting parties themselves (negotiation)
- 2. Through the assistance of a third party (facilitation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration) -> most relevant for most development NGOs
- 3. Through legal means (court decision)

Third Party Conflict Resolution ARBITRATION: Neutral 3rd party imposes decision after hearing both points of view MEDIATION: Neutral 3rd party helps parties to resolve differences themselves (through Partners) CONCILIATION: 3rd party acts as "go-between" for parties to meet and resolve differences FACILITATION: Neutral 3rd party

helps to improve communication between parties, usually in meetings (directly or through partners) NEGOTIATION: Parties meet (usually without the help of 3rd party) to resolve differences

# FIGURES & TABLES

| The World Bank on citizen security, justice and jobs            | 8  |
|---|----|
| Spectrum of Peace Interventions                                 | 10 |
| 3-Steps for Working in Fragile and Conflict affected Situations | 13 |
| Stakeholders involved in the different steps                    | 16 |
| State Fragility: Towards a Multi-Dimensional Empirical Typology | 25 |
| SCENARIO 1  | 43 |
| SCENARIO 2  | 43 |
| Field of observation  | 47 |

# Tables

| Overview of the three steps                                       | 15 |
|---|----|
| Governance framework for fragile and conflict affected situations | 29 |
| Identification of major hazards and conflicts                     | 33 |
| Symbols for Actors Mapping  | 34 |
| GOV of local institutions   | 39 |
| Conflict and Fragility Matrix                                     | 40 |

| CDA  | Collaborative for Development Action                          |
|------|---|
| CE   | Connecting elements   |
| FCS  | Fragile and Conflict-affected Situations                      |
| GOV  | Governance  |
| HRBA | Human Rights Based Approach                                   |
| HRW  | Human Right Watch   |
| ICG  | International Crisis Group                                    |
| KOFF | Kompetenzzentrum Friedensförderung (Center for Peacebuilding) |
| NGO  | Non governmental organization                                 |
| PCM  | Project cycle management                                      |
| RPP  | Responding to Peace Practice                                  |
| SOT  | Sources of tensions   |
| WFCS | Working in Fragile and Conflict affected Situations           |



Swiss Association for International Cooperation

Weinbergstrasse 22a, P.O. Box 3130, CH-8021 Zurich Phone +41 (0)44 368 65 00, Fax +41 (0)44 368 65 80 info@helvetas.org, www.helvetas.ch